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Executive Overview 
 
The structural nature of the EU’s productivity downturn is confirmed by the analysis in this 
paper, with the bulk of the deterioration emanating from an outdated and inflexible industrial 
structure which has been slow to adapt to the intensifying pressures of globalisation and rapid 
technological change. The EU’s productivity problems are driven by the combined effect of an 
excessive focus on low and medium-technology industries (with declining productivity growth 
rates and a globalisation-induced contraction in investment levels); an inability to seriously 
challenge the US’s dominance in large areas of the ICT industry, as reflected in the relatively 
small size of its ICT production sector; and finally, its apparent slowness in reaping the 
productivity enhancing benefits of ICT in a range of ICT-using industries, although measurement 
issues severely complicate an assessment of the gains from ICT production and diffusion.  
 
The post-1995 differences in EU-US productivity patterns are fundamentally driven by the US’s 
superiority in terms of its capacity to produce and absorb new technologies, most notably in the 
case of ICT. Healthy knowledge production and absorption processes are mutually supportive 
elements of any successful long run productivity strategy. Evidence is presented which suggests 
that the US’s overall innovation system is superior to that of the EU’s, both in terms of the 
quality and funding of its knowledge sector and the more favourable framework conditions 
prevailing. The repeated ability of the US system to direct resources towards the newer, high 
technology (and often high productivity growth), industries is a reflection of the quality of the 
interrelationships between the different actors in its innovation system and of an economic and 
regulatory framework which has the capacity to transform excellence in knowledge creation into 
a globally competitive industrial structure. 
 
The systemic inadequacies of the EU’s innovation system are highlighted by the experience of the 
ICT industry, with the history of this industry suggesting that a “national champions” strategy in 
high technology industries is highly problematic. A wide range of factors are shown to have 
contributed to the US’s global dominance in ICT. These factors include focussed R&D activities; 
world class research and teaching establishments; defence procurement contracts which 
nurtured the ICT industry (on the demand side) in its incubation phase in the 1950s and 1960s; 
and the unique combination of financing mechanisms and a highly competitive domestic 
marketplace which brought the ICT industry from the knowledge creation phase to the critical 
diffusion/mass market phase. The history of the ICT industry also suggests that a “national 
champions” strategy in high technology industries is a recipe for failure, with the study 
highlighting in particular the large price which Europe has paid for its “national champions” 
policy in this particular industry back in the 1960s and 1970s, which contrasted sharply with the 
strategies adopted by Japan and the US.  
 
In terms of policy, the study stresses that the EU’s innovation system needs to be fundamentally 
reformed if the EU is to make a decisive shift towards realising the vision of a successful, 
innovation-based, economic model, the broad features of which have been laid out in the Lisbon 
2010 agenda. The success of such a model will be determined not only by an increase in the 
amount of financial resources devoted to knowledge production (i.e. increased spending on R&D 
and higher education) but more importantly by an acceptance of the need to improve linkages in 
the innovation system and to make painful changes in many areas of the EU’s economic and 
regulatory environment. More specifically the present study stresses the following: 
 
•  The systemic nature of the innovation process needs to be fully recognised and the quality 
of the interrelationships between the different actors in the EU’s system needs to be 
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dramatically improved. In addressing these issues, some politically sensitive areas will 
need to be examined at the national and EU levels i.e. the principle of an excellence / 
meritocratic based system for awarding research funds; greater university autonomy, in 
financial as well as academic terms; a change of culture towards the commercialisation 
of research via closer university / business sector links; and the need to develop and 
nurture centres of excellence and leading edge technology clusters. 
 
•  The public and private sectors each play important, mutually supportive, roles in 
determining a country’s innovation capacity and each must assume its responsibilities if 
the EU’s knowledge economy objectives are to be realised. Governments have crucial 
direct and indirect roles to play in the innovation process, directly in the form of financial 
support for human capital development and for the public innovation system and, more 
importantly, indirectly in terms of shaping the macroeconomic fundamentals (low and 
stable inflation; moderate tax burdens on labour and capital; trade openness) and 
providing adequate framework conditions / regulatory regimes for the private sector to 
enhance productivity via well functioning product, labour and capital markets. 
 
•  While competition is a crucial determinant of productivity growth, industry-specific 
framework conditions need to be carefully assessed by EU policy makers due to the 
complicated link between competition and innovation. Product market structures (e.g. 
possibilities for product differentiation) and the characteristics of specific technologies 
(e.g. is it a radical or incremental innovation; are there network externalities; are there 
economies of scale in R&D) is what ultimately determines the industry specific 
relationship between market concentration (i.e. the degree of competition) and R&D 
intensity. 
 
•  Appropriate market entry and exit rules, by putting pressure on incumbent firms to 
innovate and by supporting market experimentation, are fundamental to an effective 
innovation process in rapidly changing industries. This experimentation role is 
particularly important in industries where the general purpose technologies being used 
are changing quickly such as in the production and use of ICT. This latter industry 
provides a striking example of the need for policy makers to promote entrepreneurship 
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(DIRECT + INDIRECT ROLES IN
DETERMINING PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH)
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY : A COMPLEX WEB OF DETERMINANTS AND INTERACTIONS
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* Total factor productivity is affected by factors such as labour quality/skill mix improvements; capital quality (vintage and asset composition); pure 
 technological progress; sectoral reallocation effects; changes in capacity utilisation rates and measurement errors with respect to the contributions 
 from physical capital/labour.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Europe’s growth performance has been the subject of increasing scrutiny over recent 
years, most notably in the context of the Lisbon process and its efforts to encourage 
governments to introduce employment and productivity enhancing reforms. This 
reform agenda is all the more pressing given that the EU’s underlying growth rate has 
been trending downwards since the second half of the 1990’s and since the medium to 
long term outlook points to a continuation of these trends. While many EU countries 
are understandably preoccupied with extricating their economies from the relatively 
prolonged short run downturn, it is widely acknowledged that many of the solutions 
to this slow growth problem require a longer term policy perspective. A sustainable 
medium-term recovery process in fact demands action on a Lisbon-inspired structural 
reform agenda aimed at effectively addressing the EU’s fundamental growth 
challenges, presently posed by the accelerating pace of technological change, 
globalisation (most recently in terms of the growing tradability of large parts of the 
service economy) and ageing populations.  
 
Whilst accepting the absolute necessity of encouraging a more labour intensive 
growth pattern over the medium to long term, the present paper focuses on the 
productivity part of the Lisbon agenda.  It specifically analyses the nature / source of 
the deterioration in the EU’s productivity performance relative to that in the US since 
the mid-1990’s and outlines the approach to be adopted in order to remedy this 
situation. Given the extensive treatment accorded to the productivity theme in an 
earlier ECFIN Economic Paper1, the present paper will build on this latter work by 
focussing on three specific issues related to the EU’s recent productivity performance 
and of its ambitions to become the most competitive, knowledge based, economy in 
the world by 2010 : 
 
o  Firstly, how does the EU compare with the US in terms of economy-wide 
productivity trends and how big a role has ICT played in explaining the 
diverging patterns ?  Furthermore, should the post-1995 deterioration in EU 
productivity be interpreted as a transitory or a structural phenomenon ? 
 
o  Secondly, in explaining recent EU-US divergences in productivity trends, to 
what extent is the EU’s relatively poor performance linked with its particular 
industrial structure and its difficulty in reorientating its economy towards the 
newer, higher productivity, growth sectors such as ICT ?2 In terms of the 
specific role of ICT, the study asks whether the contribution of the ICT-
producing industries to overall productivity patterns has been underestimated 
                                                 
1 Economic Paper No. 208 “An analysis of EU and US productivity developments (a total economy 
and industry level perspective)”, July 2004. 
2 In particular, is the failure of the EU’s economic system to deliver a satisfactory productivity growth 
performance linked to its inability to transform its industrial structure from one based on imitation of 
US technological advances (which worked well in the post World War II, catching-up, phase) to one 
founded on an innovation-based model (which is necessary when one is close to the technology 
frontier). 
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in favour of ICT diffusion / absorption explanations which stress the crucial 
role of a small number of intensive ICT-using industries such as wholesale 
and retail trade.    
 
o  Finally, in the context of delivering on the EU’s longer term ambitions of 
progressively moving towards a more knowledge-based economy, the study 
focuses on the specific role to be played by the production and absorption of 
new technologies in any overall strategy. While the present paper fully accepts 
that the absorption of innovation from other industries / countries will remain 
a fundamental element in determining the EU’s future productivity 
performance, it nevertheless argues strongly in favour of a greater recognition 
amongst EU policy makers of the importance of a globally competitive 
knowledge production system to the realisation of the Lisbon goals. Creating 
a system capable of delivering on both aspects of the innovation process is not 
simply an issue of more spending on R&D and 3
rd level education. More 
importantly it is a question of better linkages between the different players in 
the innovation system and a recognition of the need for a dynamic, 
competitive, business environment in accelerating the move from the 
knowledge creation / absorption phase to the critical commercial phase. 
 
 




(Sections 1 + 2)
Summary and key conclusions
(Section 5)
Key elements of an effective long run
productivity strategy for the EU
(Section 4)
Evidence regarding the
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2. EU productivity Trends at the Economy Wide Level :  
A Comparison with the US 
 
2.1 : Overview of Main Trends : At the moment, EU living standards (GDP per 
capita) are at roughly 70% of US levels, with about 1/3 of the gap due to labour 
productivity differences, with the remaining 2/3 due to differences in the utilisation of 
labour (i.e. differences in hours worked per worker and the employment rate)3.  The 
EU has also experienced some important changes over the course of the 1990’s with, 
on the positive side, the previously downward movement in the EU’s labour input4 
relative to the US coming to an end and, on the negative side, the post World War II 
convergence to US productivity levels going into reverse (graph 1). In fact, after 
having peaked in the mid-1990’s at around 97% of US levels, EU labour productivity 
per hour is projected to deteriorate to around 88% in 2005, which is close to its 
relative level in the early 1980s. This post 1995 deterioration in relative productivity 
levels reflects a sharp decline in EU productivity growth rates relative to those of the 
US over the period in question.   
 
Graph 1 : GDP per capita levels accounting - EU15 relative to the US (US=100) 
(Proportion of income differences due to labour utilisation / productivity)5 












Labour Input per 
Capita
 
Source : EU Commission, AMECO database 
                                                 
3 See Annex 1 for an overview of the ongoing discussion on measurement issues. 
4 This is driven by the increase in the EU’s employment rate relative to the US (from 87%–92% of US 
levels), with hours worked per worker stabilising at 87%-88% of US levels. 
5 Labour input per capita = hours worked per employee * employment rate (of the 2/3 difference 
between the EU and the US, 50% is due to differences in the number of hours worked per employee 
(EU workers on average work roughly 10% fewer hours) and 50% is due to differences in the 
employment rate.  In overall terms therefore the 30% income gap between the EU and the US can be 
split into 3 equal parts – 1/3 due to productivity, 1/3 due to working fewer hours and 1/3 due to the fact 
that the EU has a lower overall employment rate.  It should be noted however that, on the basis of 
present trends, an increasing proportion of the EU’s income gap with the US is emanating from 
productivity differences. 
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Graph 2 shows labour productivity per hour trend developments in the US and the EU 
since the mid-1960’s.  Over most of that time, and indeed for most of the post World 
War II period up until the mid-1990’s, the EU has enjoyed productivity growth rates 
well in excess of those prevailing in the US.  Given relatively low employment rates, 
the EU was able to use its superior productivity performance to broadly maintain its 
living standards relative to the US.  This is why policy makers need to be seriously 
concerned with the fact that the EU is now, for the first time in decades, on a trend 
productivity growth path which is lower than that of the US, with the cross-over point 
occurring in the mid-1990’s6. This recent EU performance marks a serious 
downgrading relative to the situation in the early 1990s when annual EU labour 
productivity growth was averaging 2 ½ per cent, compared with 1 ½ per cent for the 
US. Since that time there has been a dramatic reversal in fortunes, with the EU’s 
labour productivity growth rate declining by a full 1% point to 1½ per cent, compared 
with an acceleration of a roughly similar amount in the US to 2 ½ per cent.  
 
Graph 2 :  Labour Productivity Per Hour Growth Trends  












Source : EU Commission, AMECO database 
 
                                                 
6 While overall EU productivity trends have clearly deteriorated over recent years, it is important to 
underline the wide range of performances at the individual EU Member State level, with large numbers 
of countries comparing favourably with international trends.  With regard to the performance of the 
existing Member States in terms of labour productivity per person employed, there is a clear 
divergence for the Euro Area and non-Euro Area countries. The non-Euro Area Member States have 
been able to arrest the decline in their 1980’s productivity growth rate and stablise it in the 1½ -2% 
range over the 1990’s. Over the same period the Euro Area countries as a group have experienced a 
decline in their productivity growth rate from close to 2% to well under 1%.  This Euro Area pattern is 
totally dictated by developments in the big four area countries, namely Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain. The remaining 8 Euro Area countries have managed to achieve an acceleration in their 
productivity growth rates between the first and second half of the 1990’s similar to that which occurred 
in the US.  The problem of course is that with the big four countries accounting for nearly 80% of 
overall Euro Area output, the poor performances from all four of these countries ensures that the 
“Area” as a whole has a clear productivity problem and as graph 1 indicates if one includes the latest 
Spring 2004 Commission services forecasts for 2004-2005, the EU as a whole is expected to continue 
to lag behind the performance of the US over these forecast years (see Annex 3). 
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From a purely growth accounting perspective, the 1 percentage point decline in EU 
labour productivity emanates from 2 sources : 
 
•  Firstly, 50% can be attributed to a reduction in the contribution from capital 
deepening i.e. lower investment7.  
•  Secondly, the remaining 50% appears to emanate from a deterioration in total 
factor productivity i.e. a decline in the overall efficiency of the production 
process.  
 
Graph 3 : Breakdown of Trend Labour Productivity into Capital  
Deepening and TFP  

























                                                 
7 This lower rate of capital deepening (i.e. a reduction in the growth rate of investment per worker) 
reflects broadly positive factors such as the impact of labour market reforms (i.e. an unwinding of the 
unfavourable capital-for-labour substitution of earlier periods, with investment growth being lower 
than employment growth in the 1990’s) but also more worrying structural factors such as locational 
investment considerations and adverse demographic trends.  In addition, as the rest of this paper will 
emphasise, the solution is not simply an increase in capital deepening since the problem for the EU 
seems to lie more in terms of the productivity of capital rather than with the overall investment rate, 
which still compares favourably with that of the US.  The fact that labour productivity growth rates 
continue to decline in the EU, despite having relatively high investment rates, suggests that the 
marginal productivity of capital may be declining.  This could be linked to overinvestment in certain 
traditional sectors, with any additional investments in these areas yielding less and less returns, and to 
underinvestment in a range of the newer, high productivity growth, industries. Consequently, while 
Europe undoubtedly needs more investment, the more pressing need is for structural reforms in order 
to ensure that any additional resources liberated from, for example, fiscal consolidation will be directed 
to those sectors with the highest growth potential. 
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TABLE 1 : DECOMPOSITION OF US AND EU15 HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 

















2.2 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.4 2.4 
(TFP) (1.4)  (1.1)  (1.0) (1.0) (1.7) (1.5) 
(CAPITAL 
DEEPENING) 





5.4 3.7 2.3 2.5 1.8 1.5 
(TFP) (3.6)  (2.3)  (1.5) (1.4) (1.3) (0.9) 
(CAPITAL 
DEEPENING) 
(1.8) (1.4) (0.8) (1.1) (0.5) (0.6) 
Source : EU Commission, own calculations. 
 
2.2 :  ICT as an explanatory factor at the total economy level : One of the most 
popular explanations for the diverging productivity fortunes of the EU and the US has 
been the relative exposure of both areas to ICT.  Last year’s Economic Paper8 showed 
that ICT has indeed been an important part of the story, especially in terms of 
explaining the turnaround in the productivity trend of the US.  The overall 
contribution to labour productivity growth from ICT investments (i.e. purchases of 
software, computing and communications equipment) and from technical progress in 
the production of ICT goods and services (e.g. the semiconductor and 
telecommunications industries) accounted for about 60 per cent of US labour 
productivity growth over the second half of the 1990s, compared with 40 per cent in 
the four EU countries for which such a breakdown exists (i.e. France, Germany, the 
UK, and the Netherlands). This translates over the second half of the 1990s into an 
ICT contribution to labour productivity growth of around 1 ½ percentage points in the 
US and ¾ of a percentage point in the case of the EU4.  
 
In terms of the trend acceleration in US labour productivity growth over the two 
halves of the 1990’s, about half of the 1 percentage point acceleration can be directly 
attributed to ICT. In the case of the EU4 group of countries, the effects of ICT on 
both capital deepening and TFP over the same period was positive, although 
significantly less positive than in the US (Graphs 4 and 5). Consequently, given that 
ICT was not responsible for the deteriorating EU productivity trend, the role of non-
ICT determinants such as labour market reforms or the EU’s outdated industrial 
structure needs to be assessed. Section 2.3 looks at the role of labour market reforms, 
with section 3 asking whether an excessive focus on traditional, low productivity 
growth, industries could be responsible for the deteriorating EU trend. 
   
                                                 
8 No. 208, op.cit. 
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Source : DG Enterprise / GGDC and own calculations 
 
Graph 5 : Breakdown of Trend TFP into ICT and  
Rest of Economy Components (1981-2000) 
Contribution to TFP : 
Rest of Economy























Source : DG Enterprise / GGDC and own calculations 
 
2.3 : Are low EU productivity growth rates likely to be a permanent phenomenon or 
a temporary blip linked to labour market reforms ? : To help answer these questions, 
it is helpful to review the basic growth patterns (employment and productivity) 
between the EU and the US in the 1990s  : 
 
o  The EU’s trend productivity growth rate, as shown earlier, continued to 
decline throughout the 1990’s and fell below the equivalent, and rapidly 
increasing, US productivity growth rate around the middle of the decade. 
 
o  Regarding employment, the decline in employment rates in the EU came to an 
end in the early 1990’s and started to trend upwards. In the US a positive 
trend continued but at a slower pace.  
 
o  Closely associated with the movement in labour productivity growth, fairly 
parallel trend developments for capital-labour substitution were observed, i.e. 
a further decline in Europe and an increase in the US. 
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Graph 6 shows the basic movements for the EU for these three variables, with these 
trends especially striking when contrasted with those of the US over the same period 
(Graph 7). This comparison shows in a dramatic way the extent to which the EU 
economy is failing to exploit the technological opportunities which are presently 
available in the world economy. The US in contrast has experienced a marked trend 
reversal in its labour productivity performance, with the latter strongly linked to its 
exploitation of the opportunities presented by the ICT industry. 
 
Graph 6 : EU Labour Productivity, Capital-Labour Substitution 
and Employment Rate Trends  

























 Source : EU Commission, AMECO database 
 
Graph 7 : US Labour Productivity, Capital-Labour Substitution 
and Employment Rate Trends  






















 Source : EU Commission, AMECO database 
 
The trends in these graphs can be assessed in alternative ways, with different 
interpretations having different implications for the long run outlook for productivity 
and employment, with our main interest here being productivity.  
 
o  A popular interpretation explains the recent productivity trends as a response 
of the economy to a positive labour supply shock. The shock to labour 
supply/wages could be the result of labour market reforms. It could also 
reflect an increasing awareness amongst European citizens that pension 
income will be more uncertain in the future. This negative income effect could 
have contributed to an increase in labour force participation. Under this 
interpretation, recent developments could be judged as healthy. Slower wage 
growth could have led to a temporary decline in capital-labour substitution. 
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Once full employment is reached, wage and productivity growth could 
accelerate again and the economy could go back to a higher growth rate of 
labour productivity at a higher level of employment. The decline in 
productivity growth and in capital-labour substitution (i.e. capital deepening) 
could thus be regarded as a temporary phenomenon.  
 
o  An alternative view regards the labour market story as incomplete. According 
to this view, the data can be explained correctly only if one assumes a 
negative shock to productivity, either in the form of a decline in the growth 
rate of TFP or in the form of a positive shock to capital productivity, with the 
latter shock induced by higher required rates of return for investors. At the 
macro level a trend decline in TFP could be due to a further increase in the 
size of the service sector; a reduction in the quality of labour as more low 
skilled workers are brought into the labour force; and / or a trend decline in 
technological advances in traditional manufacturing industries. Also with 
globalisation and increased international capital mobility, the higher returns 
which can be earned outside Europe may exert pressure on capital 
productivity9. Both developments could explain why capital-labour 
substitution declined10.    
 
Both of the above interpretations would obviously provide a different diagnosis for 
Europe. According to the first view, recent productivity trends are a temporary 
phenomenon and a healthy indication that labour markets in Europe have become 
more flexible. The second view is more pessimistic. It regards the productivity 
slowdown as a continuation of the previous adverse productivity trends, with the 
recent increase in employment simply having an additional temporary, negative, 
effect on productivity. The productivity picture is further complicated by a third 
possible explanatory factor, namely aggregate demand, with domestic demand over 
the most recent period being sluggish, triggering a cyclical impact on measured 
productivity11. 
                                                 
9 This positive shock to capital productivity must be interpreted in the context of locational investment 
considerations and from the perspective of changes in the required rates of return expected by 
international investors / stockmarkets. With improved international communications and reductions in 
transport costs, international locational choices for investors have increased and investment is 
undertaken in those regions which offer the most favourable (expected) ratio between capital 
productivity and capital cost. The US investment boom in the 1990’s offers a good example of how 
investment opportunities in one country can attract substantial foreign direct investment. Falling ICT 
investment prices and high rates of innovation, as expressed by accelerating productivity and TFP 
growth rates, created an exceptionally positive investment climate in the US in the 1990’s which in 
turn led to a strong increase in US investment. These international investment trends were 
unfortunately not without repercussions for domestic EU investment rates. 
10 It is also interesting to notice that the negative productivity shock could be consistent with a 
temporary increase in employment (see Gali -1999). While this is a theoretical possibility, it should not 
be seen as a credible alternative explanation (to labour market reforms) for the increase in employment 
which occurred.  In fact, as the VAR analysis points out, the link is empirically weak. 
11 Unpublished work done recently by DG ECFIN suggests that very little of the decline in the TFP 
part of productivity is cyclical in nature. ECFIN has calculated trend TFP using a Kalman Filter 
approach which removes the cyclical part of TFP by using correlations with a capacity utilisation 
series.  This procedure shows that the Kalman Filter derived trend TFP is very close to ECFIN’s 
stochastic trend TFP estimates and that there are few cyclical influences at play. 
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To analyse more rigorously whether the productivity pattern is temporary or more 
structural, we need to be able to identify the nature of the shocks driving productivity.  
We use a VAR methodology to analyse the various contributions to the productivity 
slowdown, coming from the three shock variables : employment, productivity and 
demand.  A VAR analysis is particularly suited for this purpose since it allows us to 
identify the driving forces behind employment and productivity and, in addition, to 
analyse the temporary versus permanent nature of the effects. 
 
Box 1 contains a technical description of the VAR analysis. This analysis is used 
firstly to examine to what extent the increase in employment can explain the decline 
in productivity growth. The VAR analysis identifies a sequence of positive 
employment shocks in the second half of the 1990s which have increased the level of 
employment by about 5% in the Euro area. The shock driving employment, however, 
only had a small effect on productivity (Graph 8). According to the estimate, the 5% 
increase in employment has reduced the level of productivity by only about 0.75%. 
This is about 10% of the total reduction in productivity growth experienced since the 
mid 1990s. Hence, employment shocks can only marginally explain the decline in 
productivity growth12. 
 
Graph 8 : Euro Area Employment Shock : 1995 Q1 to 2003 Q4 












Source : Own calculations 
 
The second contribution of the VAR model relates to the question of the structural 
versus temporary nature of the effects.  Based on the underlying assumptions on the 
short, medium and long term impact of the various shocks, the VAR model attributes 
most of the decline in productivity to a structural trend decline in productivity 
growth. As can be seen from graph 9, the autonomous shock to productivity explains 
a decline in the level of productivity of 5%, which would translate into an annual 
average productivity growth rate effect of the order of 0.6%. This is fully consistent 
with the growth accounting result given earlier of a decline in TFP of the order of ½ a 
percentage point, with TFP considered to be a reflection of the structural component 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that this VAR estimate of 10% is at the lower end of the estimates obtained using 
a range of estimation methods. For example, results from the Commission’s QUEST model suggest 
that about 30% of the reduction in productivity growth could be explained by the employment shock. 
Also results from growth regressions suggest that about 25% of the productivity decline is due to the 
increase in employment. 
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of the productivity trend.  Graph 9 also indicates that the autonomous productivity 
shock is unable to explain the increase in employment. Therefore, an interpretation of 
both shocks is necessary in order to give a complete picture of the employment and 
productivity developments. However, concerning productivity, the overall conclusion 
from the analysis suggests that the decline in productivity growth is to a large extent 
structural in nature.  
 
Graph 9 : Euro Area Productivity Shock : 1995 Q1 to 2003 Q4 











Source : Own calculations 
 
SHARP DETERIORATION IN EU PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN 1990's RELATIVE TO US








FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
DECADES, THE EU IS ON A
TREND PRODUCTIVITY PATH
WHICH IS LOWER THAN
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Overview of EU Productivity Trends
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BOX 1 : IDENTIFYING STRUCTURAL SHOCKS TO EMPLOYMENT, PRODUCTIVITY AND DEMAND WITH 
A STRUCTURAL VAR MODEL 
 
 
We use a structural VAR (SVAR) methodology, based on Stock and Watson (1988) and Blanchard and 
Quah (1990), for the identification of structural shocks. The intuition for shock identification in 
Blanchard and Quah is based on the idea that demand shocks only have temporary effects while supply 
shocks have permanent effects. Stock and Watson extend this approach and allow for separate supply 
contributions from labour and productivity (TFP).  In order to identify different supply contributions, 
namely those coming from employment and those coming from productivity, additional identification 
criteria must be introduced. Stock and Watson use long run restrictions implied by the neoclassical 
growth model for that task. The neoclassical growth model appears to be suitable, since there are at 
least three important features in the long run trends shown in Graphs 8 and 9 which are compatible 
with this model : 
 
o  1. There is a close trend correlation between the growth of labour productivity and capital 
intensity. 
 
o  2. Capital intensity and productivity grow at a similar rate in the long run. 
 
o  3. If one looks over long periods of time and across the EU and the US, the employment rate 
appears to be unrelated with productivity growth. 
 
If one uses the neoclassical growth model then one can impose the following long run structure on the 
data:  
 
o  The labour market shock can have short and long run effects on employment, productivity 
and inflation. 
 
o  The productivity shock can have long run effects on productivity and inflation but only short 
and medium run effects on employment. (This constraint arises from the assumption that real 
wages are indexed to productivity in the long run). 
 
o  The demand shock can have a long run effect on inflation only but not on employment and 
productivity. No long run constraint is imposed on inflation. 
 
These three types of restrictions imply a triangular long run structure between the growth rate of 
employment ( ), productivity ( h ∆ ) ( h y − ∆ ) and inflation (π ) on the one hand and the 
corresponding shocks to employment (v), productivity (e) and demand (d) on the other. If one defines 
the vector  [] t t t t t h y h x π ∆ − ∆ ∆ ∆ ), ( , =  and the vector [ ] t t d v , t t e , = ξ , then the moving average 
representation of this model is given by : 
 























where the matrix A(1) shows the long run restrictions. Notice, this particular structure is particularly 
suited to test for the short, medium and long run effects of an employment shock. Allowing for a non-
zero long run productivity effect of an employment shock allows one to test for labour quality effects 
associated with a permanent change in the employment rate. A similar analysis has been conducted by 
Gali (1999). He is mainly interested in the employment effects of productivity shocks. 
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3. The structural nature of the EU’s Productivity Problem – A Sectoral /  
Industry Level Breakdown 
 
The present section extends the analysis from section 2, in particular its suggestion 
that the EU has a structural productivity problem, by taking a closer look at sectoral / 
industry level productivity developments.  Two specific issues are examined : 
 
o  Firstly, an attempt is made in 3.1 / 3.2 to isolate the source of the EU’s 
productivity problems at both the sectoral / industry levels : are those 
difficulties confined to the manufacturing, private services or rest of the 
economy sectors or linked to particularly dynamic specific industries within 
these broad sectors ? In addition, by categorising the different industries on 
the basis of their ICT content into ICT producing, intensive ICT-using and 
less-intensive ICT-using industries, the section gives a more detailed insight 
into the role of ICT in shaping overall EU and US productivity trends.  The 
key question is to what extent Europe’s problems reflect an inflexible and 
outdated industrial structure which has failed to fully exploit the direct and 
indirect productivity benefits from new, leading edge, technologies such as 
ICT. 
 
o  Secondly, whilst not questioning the overall contribution of ICT to labour 
productivity trends, section 3.3 adds to the ongoing debate regarding the 
relative importance of the different channels (i.e. production, investment and 
spillover effects) via which ICT impacts on the respective economies. It is 
contended that a large proportion of the recent literature may be 
underestimating the direct gains from the production of ICT goods and 
services in favour of the view that most of the gains emanate from the use of 
ICT. This debate on the respective contributions of the different ICT 
transmission channels is important to the policy debate in the final section of 
the paper when we discuss a productivity agenda for the EU and the 
importance to be attributed to the production and absorption of new 
technologies.   
 
3.1 : Productivity trends at the sectoral level (1980-2000)13 : The basis for this 
sectoral level analysis is an aggregation of a 56 industry breakdown of the EU and US 
                                                 
13 For the analysis in sections 3.1 and 3.2 we use an internationally comparable dataset from the 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC).  This dataset has a 56 industry breakdown for 
all 15 of the old Member States and for the US and is essentially an expanded version of the OECD’s 
STAN database. An interesting feature of this dataset is that, for all countries, it uses US hedonic 
deflators for deflating the relevant ICT industries and classifies computer software as investment 
expenditure (and not as a business expense which is the convention in a large number of EU countries). 
It therefore provides a more accurate, internationally comparable, estimate of the contribution of ICT 
to the growth performances of the respective countries. In this way it is possible to assess whether the 
decline in EU labour productivity growth could be due, as some commentators have suggested, to 
mismeasurement of the growth impact of ICT. For example, Jorgenson (2003) asserts that ICT has 
made a much larger contribution to growth in the non-US, G7, countries than that suggested by official 
statistics. In his recent paper, “Information Technology and the G7 economies”, he compares the 
growth performances of the G7 economies, on the basis of an internationally comparable dataset 
(similar to the one used in this section) which focusses on the impact of investment in IT equipment 
and software. See also the “Economist” article “Computing the gains”, of 25 October 2003, which 
summarises the Jorgenson paper. 
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economies into the three broad sectors of manufacturing, private services and rest of 
economy (i.e. primary industries + public services). While section 3.2 will analyse the  
contributions of each of the 56 industries to the acceleration in US labour productivity 
compared with the EU over the second half of the 1990’s, the present section confines 
itself to an overview of the longer term patterns for the different sectors. This longer 
term analysis enables us to show the contribution of each of the three sectors to the 
total economy labour productivity growth of both the EU and the US (i.e. the 
combined effect of productivity growth in the specific sector and of its share in 
overall output). To give some idea of the respective weights in overall output, 
manufacturing presently accounts for roughly 20% of EU and US output, with private 
services and the “rest of economy” sectors representing 55% and 25% respectively.   
 
The overall trends for the period 1980-2000 are given in Graph 10, with the key 
points to be retained being the following :  
 
o  In terms of overall labour productivity growth rates, the aggregation of the 56 
industries confirms the trends established in Section  2 on the basis of the 
economy-wide data, namely that the EU has experienced a sharp deterioration 
in its labour productivity growth over the two halves of the 1990s, with the 
US experiencing a marked acceleration.  This is a significant conclusion since 
the datasets used for the sectoral analysis have been constructed using a very 
different methodology compared with those employed for the economy wide 
analysis in Section 2 (see footnote 13). 
  
o  For manufacturing, the EU is on a long run downward trend due to its 
dependence on a range of low to medium technology industries which are 
increasingly exposed to the competitive pressures of globalisation.  The US on 
the other hand appears to have arrested its 1980’s decline and has managed to 
put itself on a slightly rising trend since the mid-1990’s, driven in large part 
by its global dominance in high technology industries such as semiconductors 
and office machinery.  
 
o  More impressive still has been the US’s relative performance in the private 
services sector.  Nearly 2/3 of the US’s overall productivity growth rate now 
emanates from services, compared with as little as 1/6 at the beginning of the 
1980’s.  Over the same period the EU’s private services sector has been 
contributing less and less in absolute terms to overall EU labour productivity 
growth.   
 
o  Finally, the EU is doing better than the US in the “rest of the economy” sector 
(i.e. primary industries / public services) but even here the trend is downwards 
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Graph 10 : Contributions to the Total Change in Labour Productivity per Hour 
from Manufacturing, Private Services and the Rest of the Economy (Primary 
Industries + Public Services)  




















































Note : The graphs show the contribution to the total change in labour productivity per hour i.e. the 
combined effect of labour productivity growth and the output shares of the respective industries. The 
graphs have all the same scale and are additive (i.e. manufacturing + services + rest of economy = 
total economy). 
Source : GGDC and own calculations 
 
3.2. : Productivity trends at the industry level : A 56 Industry breakdown of labour 
productivity trends : Where are the EU’s problems emanating from ? : Following 
on from the sectoral level analysis in 3.1, the present section provides a snapshot of 
each of the 56 industries and their importance for the productivity performance of the 
EU and US economies over the second half of the 1990’s. This breakdown is shown 
in graph 11 and visualises the productivity dilemma facing the EU by giving a 
panoramic overview of the contribution of the 56 industries.  For ease of exposition 
the industries are shown as part of the manufacturing, private services and rest of 
economy sectors which has already been discussed in 3.1.  
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3.2.1 : Overview of all 56 Industries (1996-2000) : Graph 11 shows that the EU has 
been doing reasonably well compared with the US in a wide range of manufacturing 
and service industries over the second half of the 1990’s. However, the problem is 
that most of these industries are not making big contributions to overall productivity 
growth, with the graph indicating a contribution of much less than 0.1% for most of 
the industries concerned. For example, while Graph 11 shows that the EU’s chemical 
industry contributed more than twice as much to the EU’s overall productivity growth 
rate as did the equivalent US industry, it nevertheless still contributed only 0.07% 
points to the EU’s overall total. This is only 1/8 of the contribution of the 
semiconductor industry to overall US productivity growth14. This latter industry in 
fact contributed nearly a quarter of all US productivity growth over the period 1996-
2000. This basic story is replicated right across the 56 industries. In the 37, mainly 
traditional and medium tech, industries where the EU has equalled or outperformed 
the US over the second half of the 1990’s, apart from communications15, all of the 
remainder are either low productivity growth industries or do not have a large enough 
share of EU output to alter the EU’s overall productivity performance. In addition, for 
most of these industries not only are productivity growth rates low but they have been 
declining over the course of the 1990’s.   
                                                 
14 It should be noted that the US productivity revival is not the result of a massive reallocation of 
employment to high productivity growth industries but is rather the result of productivity gains in 
industries where the US has had a strong position from the beginning of the 1990s (like in ICT 
production). In fact the reallocation effect for aggregate productivity growth is small in both regions 
(about zero in the EU and -0.1% points in the US). Also the correlation between productivity growth 
and employment changes across industries is of a similar magnitude in both the EU and the US if one 
excludes the real estate industry which is difficult to measure. 
15 It should be stressed that within the ICT-producing sector, communications is an industry where the 
EU has an undoubted advantage over the US, is characterised by high productivity growth and has a 
relatively large share of EU output. 
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Source : GGDC and own calculations (See Annex 5 for the value added shares and productivity growth rates of the respective industries which are combined to 
produce graph 11) 
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3.2.2 : Breakdown of 56 Industries Based on their ICT content : Another way of 
highlighting the EU’s underlying productivity problem is to classify the 56 industries 
according to their ICT content into ICT producing, intensive ICT-using and less 
intensive ICT-using industries. This has the advantage of firstly isolating the importance 
of ICT in driving overall productivity growth and secondly this three-way ICT 
breakdown can also be used as a rough proxy for high, medium and low productivity 
industries in the EU and US as a whole. This breakdown is given in Table 2 which 
indicates that the ICT producing manufacturing and intensive ICT-using private 
services categories are driving the 1996-2000 divergences in EU-US productivity 
growth rates (Graph 13). In fact, these two groups of industries were responsible for 
virtually all of the acceleration in US productivity over the second half of the 1990’s. It 
is precisely in these two areas of the economy that the EU fares badly relative to the US 
either in terms of the size of the respective industries (i.e. small shares of overall EU 
output) or by having relatively low productivity growth rates. In addition, as shown in 
the 2004 Economic Paper (No.208), in terms of explaining EU-US productivity growth 
differentials over the second half of the 1990’s, it turns out that out of the total of 56 
industries, just five (semiconductors; communications; wholesale trade; retail trade; and 
financial services) dominate the overall labour productivity growth patterns and all five 
are located in the ICT-producing and ICT-using categories. These 5 specific industries 
contributed 80 per cent of the US total productivity growth rate over 1996-2000, 
compared with a contribution of only 40 per cent in the case of the EU. 
 
Table 2 : Breakdown of Total Economy into 3 categories – 2 ICT categories (ICT producing + 
Intensive ICT-Using) and 1 category of Less Intensive ICT using (i.e. more traditional) industries  
Hourly Labour Productivity 
(Average % Change) 
Value Added Share  Contribution to Total Change 
in Hourly Labour Productivity   
1991-1995 1996-2000 1991-1995 1996-2000 1991-1995 1996-2000 
Total Economy (1+2+3)
EU 2.3 1.6  1 1 2.3 1.6 
US 1.1 2.3  1 1 1.1 2.3 
1. Manufacturing Sector
EU 3.7 2.6  0.23 0.21 0.9 0.5 
US 3.6 4.6  0.19 0.18 0.7 0.8 
1(a) ICT-Producing Manufacturing Industries
EU  (9.6) (17.1) 0.02 0.01 (0.2)  (0.2) 
US  (16.4) (26.0) 0.03 0.03 (0.4)  (0.7) 
1(b)  Intensive ICT-Using Manufacturing Industries
EU  (2.6) (2.0) 0.07 0.06 (0.2)  (0.1) 
US  (-0.6) (1.4) 0.06 0.05 (0.0)  (0.1) 
1(c) Rest of Manufacturing (Less-Intensive ICT using)
EU  (3.6) (1.6) 0.14 0.13 (0.5)  (0.2) 
US  (2.6) (0.6) 0.10 0.11 (0.3)  (0.1) 
2. Private Services Sector
EU 1.9 1.4  0.52 0.54 1.0 0.7 
US 1.0 2.7  0.53 0.54 0.5 1.5 
2(a) ICT-Producing Service Industries
EU  (4.8) (6.8) 0.03 0.03 (0.2)  (0.2) 
US  (2.4) (0.8) 0.03 0.04 (0.1)  (0.0) 
2(b) Intensive ICT-Using Service Industries
EU  (1.8) (2.1) 0.20 0.21 (0.4)  (0.4) 
US  (1.6) (5.3) 0.23 0.25 (0.4)  (1.3) 
2(c) Rest of  Services (Less-Intensive ICT using)
EU  (1.7) (0.2) 0.29 0.30 (0.5)  (0.1) 
US  (0.2) (0.3) 0.27 0.26 (0.1)  (0.1) 
3. Rest of Economy (Primary Industries + Public Services) (Less Intensive ICT-Using) 
EU 2.0 1.1  0.25 0.25 0.5 0.3 
US -0.3 -0.1  0.28 0.27 -0.1  0.0 
Source :  GGDC and own calculations 
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GRAPH 12 : CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE 56 INDUSTRIES TO OVERALL LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE US + EU15  (1996-2000)  
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Graph 13 : Contribution to the total change in Trend Labour Productivity per 
Hour from ICT-Producing Manufacturing and intensive ICT-using Private 
Services 


























Intensive ICT Using 
Private Services
 
Source : DG Enterprise / GGDC and own calculations 
 
Regarding the less-intensive ICT-using part of the respective economies, the 
slowdown in the EU’s productivity growth rate in both the “rest of manufacturing”, 
“rest of services” and “rest of economy” categories shown in Table 2 is marked over 
the most recent period. These more traditional industries collectively still account for 
over 70 per cent of EU GDP. The US has also experienced a slowdown in 
productivity growth in their “rest of manufacturing” category, whilst showing only 
marginal changes in the “rest of services” and the “rest of economy” categories. In 
the case of the US, however, the globalisation-related downturn in their more 
traditional manufacturing industries and the relatively poor contribution from a range 
of its low to medium-tech service industries was offset by strong performances 
elsewhere in the economy. In particular the US has had good performances in the 
newer, more knowledge intensive, manufacturing industries such as semiconductors 
and in a number of its intensive ICT-using service industries. The problem for the EU 
is that its pattern of declining / expanding industries is very different to that in the US, 
with the EU’s trend productivity growth rate being pushed downwards by : 
 
•  firstly, having a greater share of its production concentrated in traditional 
manufacturing industries16 where the EU has in the past been strong in global 
terms but where competitive conditions are now becoming more difficult due 
to globalisation.  
 
•  secondly, the EU is experiencing a further increase in its share of private 
services, with below average growth rates of labour productivity (at least 
historically), and with an additional downward shift in productivity in these 
                                                 
16 14% of EU output is still produced in these traditional industries compared with a share of 10% in 
the US. 
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industries over the 1990’s due to the labour market reforms discussed earlier.  
It is in these traditional service industries, such as hotels and restaurants, 
transport etc, where the productivity reducing effects of these reforms have 
been felt most.  
 
•  thirdly, unlike in the case of the US, the productivity contributions from the 
EU’s ICT manufacturing and intensive ICT-using service industries cannot 
make up for the losses in its more traditional manufacturing and private 
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3.3 Are the ICT Productivity Gains coming from the production of ICT goods and 
services, from ICT capital deepening or from spillover effects ?  
 
The analysis in section 3.2 showed that it was the superior performance of the US in 
ICT-producing manufacturing and in ICT-using service industries, such as wholesale 
and retail trade, which was the source of the diverging EU-US productivity trends 
since the mid-1990’s. While this is the generally accepted view of developments, a 
number of commentators have been surprised by the fact that the large productivity 
enhancing effects of ICT have tended to appear in the hard-to-measure service 
industries and not in other well measured areas of the economy such as 
manufacturing. While the present analysis is not an attempt to rewrite the conclusions 
from section 3.2, it nevertheless tries to rebalance the messages coming out from this 
work in order to impress on policy makers that the EU’s productivity problems 
emanate both from the ICT production side as well as from the ICT adoption / using 
side. Whilst accepting that these measurement issues in the services sector are 
                                                 
17 Regarding the demographic challenges facing Europe, ageing could represent an additional factor 
explaining both the adverse sectoral changes which have occurred in Europe and the limited adaptation 
of companies to new technology trends. As societies age, there will be increasing demand for the 
output of a range of relatively low productivity industries such as health and social services, and less 
demand for the output of higher productivity sectors such as consumer durables. In addition, an ageing 
labour force may be less willing/able to switch into the latest leading-edge technology fields or have 
the capacity to generate the type of new innovative ideas needed to stay at the technology frontier. 
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unlikely to be resolved in the near future, what must be avoided at all costs is that 
erroneous policy conclusions are drawn given the uncertainties involved.   
 
Productivity Developments and the Difficulties in disentangling the respective 
contributions from ICT Production and Diffusion (Capital Deepening + 
Spillovers18) : A primary source of the acceleration in US productivity growth in the 
1990s has been the increasing share of ICT production in the overall output of the US 
economy allied to the extraordinary TFP gains in this specific industry. A second 
channel through which ICT has impacted on productivity has been through capital 
deepening, with the falling prices for ICT equipment leading to sharp increases in 
ICT investment rates (i.e. diffusion in the narrow sense of the term). While the 
economy-wide productivity gains from these two ICT transmission channels are both 
impressive, what has been missing up until now has been evidence that these large 
ICT investments have been generating productivity gains in those industries actually 
using this equipment (i.e. diffusion in the wider sense of the term). Given the “general 
purpose technology” characteristics of ICT19, one would expect to be witnessing these 
productivity “spillover” effects from using the technology, with these TFP gains 
representing a third channel via which ICT can impact on aggregate productivity.   
 
From the analysis in 3.2 it would appear that the experience of a small number of 
intensive-ICT using industries in the US has provided some evidence that these 
elusive “spillover” effects are finally emerging. However, as this section will show, 
the debate is far from settled with a large degree of controversy still surrounding the 
size of the productivity contribution coming from these specific ICT using industries, 
with Gordon20 remaining sceptical whilst Stiroh / O’Mahony21 are more optimistic. 
Attempts to disentangle ICT production, ICT investment and ICT spillover effects on 
labour productivity growth, using different methodologies, different levels of 
aggregation and different datasets arrive at rather heterogeneous conclusions. This 
makes it difficult not only to locate the precise source of the current productivity 
divergence between the US and Europe but it also complicates projections on future 
productivity growth and policy recommendations. This section reviews the alternative 
approaches and tries to trace the source of the productivity gains in specific ICT using 
service industries, such as wholesale and retail trade, at a higher level of 
                                                 
18  Spillover effects are the efficiency gains achieved from using ICT equipment. 
19 The contribution of ICT diffusion to productivity growth makes it a prime example of a General 
Purpose Technology (GPT).  According to Bresnahan & Trajtenberg (1995), a GPT has the following 
three characteristics : pervasiveness - spreading to most sectors; improvement - constant lowering of 
costs to users; and innovation spanning - making it easier to invent and produce new products and 
processes.  Jovanovic and Rousseau (2003) illustrate how ICT easily matches these criteria.  In 
addition, they demonstrate for ICT another typical symptom of a GPT : namely that in the initial phase 
of a GPT, productivity may actually slow down before it peaks.  This is due to various adjustment 
costs, learning delays and the slow introduction of the necessary complementary investments.  As such 
the EU-US gap in ICT contributions may reflect different phases in the GPT cycle. Furthermore, 
Jovanovic and Rousseau link ICT’s arrival as a GPT to higher firm entry and exit rates, with the 
young, smaller, firms doing better relative to the old incumbent firms, indicating the importance of 
flexible product markets for the diffusion of new technologies. 
20 Gordon (2003) 
21 Stiroh (2002) and O’Mahony et al. (2003) 
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disaggregation. However, it also points to a more fundamental problem, namely how 
to measure productivity in those service industries which are heavy users of ICT 
technologies.   
 
Results from International / Regional Comparison Approach : If one looks at 
international / regional cross section data, then ICT production rather than ICT-use, 
appears to be the dominant source of productivity growth. As can be seen from 
Graphs 14 and 15, there is a correlation between productivity growth and ICT 
production in the 1990s but there is little correlation between productivity growth and 
ICT investment. Consistent with the international data, Daveri and Mascotto (2002) 
present evidence across US states which suggest that the productivity acceleration 
mostly occurred in those States specialised in the production of IT goods and 
services. Based on cross-State econometric regressions over the period 1987-2000 
they conclude that “… when States where IT production and non IT durable 
manufacturing which are mostly localized are excluded, the remaining States do not 
exhibit any significant acceleration in productivity. In particular, the association 
between productivity gains and IT use is weak”. 
 
 
Graph 14 : Hourly Labour Productivity Growth and the ICT Production Share 
(1995-2000) 
 
Source : GGDC, Ameco 
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Graph 15 : Hourly Labour Productivity Growth and the ICT Investment Share 
(1995-2000) 
 
Source : GGDC, Ameco 
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Results from the Growth Accounting Approach : Growth accounting exercises, on 
the other hand, attribute a sizeable fraction (i.e. about half) of the productivity 
acceleration to the use of ICT. Recent exercises22 for the US estimate that ICT 
investment has contributed about 0.5% points to US productivity growth, with ICT 
production contributing another 0.5% points. Other studies, such as Inklaar et al 
(2003), suggest a 0.24% point contribution from ICT production and a 0.19% point 
contribution from ICT investment for an EU4 aggregate (see Table 3)23, with higher 
contributions for the US (0.40% points for ICT investment and 0.36% points for ICT 
production). As the Inklaar results in table 3 show, the absolute difference between 
the US and the EU in terms of ICT capital deepening is largely due to one specific 
industry, namely financial services (FS). If one excludes the FS industry, it is striking 
that the contribution of ICT capital deepening to the change in labour productivity 
growth (i.e. ICT diffusion in a narrow sense) has been remarkably similar on both 
sides of the Atlantic. These figures suggest that the EU is catching up with the US in 
terms of the usage/diffusion of ICT in the narrow sense of the term (i.e. in terms of 
the actual purchases of ICT investment goods and services by the different 
industries).   
 
However, what Table 3 also shows is that there are big differences between the EU 
and the US in terms of the spillover effects from these investments. For example, 
while the EU and the US wholesale trade (WT) and retail trade (RT) industries have 
both made similar gains in terms of ICT capital deepening, the US appears to have 
                                                 
22 Gordon (2003) quoting an unpublished update of Oliner and Sichel (2002)  
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reaped substantially more from the use of this capital in the form of much higher TFP 
gains  (i.e. ICT diffusion in the broader sense).  It must be emphasised however that 
these TFP gains occur in a very narrow segment of the services sector where 
productivity is difficult to measure. In other better measured areas such as ICT using 
manufacturing24, Table 3 shows that the relative TFP gains in the US are significantly 
smaller.  
 
One can argue that the above analysis provides evidence of positive spillover effects 
in the US, i.e. ICT investment is enabling organisational changes in ICT using 
industries. The fact that the TFP accelerations in ICT using industries are not 
observed in the EU could be due either to adjustment costs (EU is in an earlier stage 
of the transition) or it could be the result of institutional / regulatory constraints in 
specific industries (e.g. land use regulations / opening hours in WT and RT; less entry 
of new establishments / insufficient competition etc) which prevents firms from 
reaping the full benefits of the new technology in EU countries.  
 
 
Table 3 : Growth Accounting Estimates 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 





LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (1+2+3+4+5) 1.25  -.27 
Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth Differential 
1. LABOUR QUALITY -.07  -.09 
2. EMPLOYMENT REALLOCATION EFFECT .05  -.06 
3. ICT CAPITAL DEEPENING : TOTAL ECONOMY  .40  .19 
  3A: ICT PRODUCING INDUSTRIES .04  .03 
  3B: ICT USING INDUSTRIES .29  .14 
    -ICT USING MANUFACTURING .01  .01 
    -WHOLESALE TRADE .05  .05 
    -RETAIL TRADE .01  .01 
    -FINANCIAL SERVICES .17  .02 
    -BUSINESS SERVICES .05  .05 
  3C: LESS INTENSIVE ICT USING INDUSTRIES  .07  .03 
4. NON ICT CAPITAL DEEPENING :TOTAL ECONOMY* .08  -.45 
5. TFP : TOTAL ECONOMY .79  .13 
  5A: ICT PRODUCING INDUSTRIES .36  .24 
  5B: ICT USING INDUSTRIES  .83  .02 
    -ICT USING MANUFACTURING .06  .00 
    -WHOLESALE TRADE .31  -.02 
    -RETAIL TRADE .28  -.03 
    -FINANCIAL SERVICES .27  .06 
    -BUSINESS SERVICES -.10  .01 
   5C: LESS INTENSIVE ICT USING INDUSTRIES -.40  -.13 
* In terms of non-ICT capital deepening in WT and RT, only small differences exist between the US 
and the EU4 
Source : Inklaar et al (2003) 
 
                                                 
24 Inklaar et al. classify the paper, printing and publishing, machinery as well as furniture and misc. 
manufacturing as ICT using industries. 
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There are also two counter arguments to the US spillover thesis that should be taken 
into account :  
 
•  Gordon (2003), argues that the revival in RT and WT productivity is due to 
organisational changes unrelated to the use of ICT25. Microeconomic evidence 
provided by Foster et al (2002) shows that productivity growth is strongly linked 
with new establishments, whilst existing establishments do not experience a 
productivity gain26. This is despite the massive investment in ICT which 
presumably went into both old and new establishments (e.g. bar code readers have 
become universal in old and new retail stores). Gordon consequently speculates 
that productivity gains in the newly built “big box” stores may reflect far more 
than just the use of computers, such as for example size effects, better unloading 
systems, improved storage facilities etc.  
 
•  A second line of argumentation stresses statistical problems with measuring 
productivity in WT and RT. Volume measures for WT and RT are calculated 
using the deflators of the products sold by the WT and RT industries27. This 
practice could imply that countries where the share of ICT goods sold to firms and 
private households is large and where quality improvements are fully taken into 
account in the price measures, may have a larger increase in WT and RT 
productivity simply because prices in the basket of goods sold are falling more 
strongly28.  If there has been a genuine productivity acceleration, because of the 
higher use of ICT in WT and RT, one would expect the productivity gains to be 
evenly distributed across different WT and RT sub-sectors. If the productivity 
acceleration can be traced to specific sub-sectors within the RT and WT industries 
with a relatively large exposure to ICT, there is a higher likelihood that the 
acceleration could be largely due to measurement issues related to ICT :  
 
- For WT one observes (Table 4) that the productivity increases are 
concentrated in the durables sector, and within durables in sub-sectors with a 
                                                 
25 In the case of financial intermediation it has been argued by Stiroh (2002), for example, that one 
should be careful in assuming spillover effects since the productivity effects in financial services have 
probably been strongly influenced by the stock market bubble. 
26 This is consistent with the view that the within-firm productivity differences between the EU and 
the US are small. The big differences are due to the high productivity growth rates of the new entrants 
to the US retail market.  This is why entry and exit rules / planning laws are often mentioned as 
possible explanations for EU-US productivity differentials. Other factors linked to globalisation could 
also be playing a role. For example, there is anecdotal evidence that Wal Mart and the large US 
supermarket groups are sourcing a much larger proportion of their goods from low-cost production 
centres such as China, compared with European retailers. 
27   See Ahmad et al (2004) and Triplett and Bosworth (2000). 
28 For example, this means that since the volume of computer sales has increased due to improvements 
in speed and capacity, a store which sells the same number of computers at the end and at the 
beginning of the 1990s would record a higher productivity growth rate without any change in the 
organisation (number of employees and hours worked) of the store. As noted by Triplett and Bosworth, 
a volume measure for the goods sold by a certain retail sector which combines the increase in quality 
with the growth in the number of goods, as is the case with hedonically deflated goods, bears little 
relationship to the actual activities of the store, even though it is the appropriate output measure for 
that specific good. 
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high ICT concentration such as commercial equipment and electrical and 
electronic goods. This disaggregation suggests therefore that the productivity 
acceleration is closely linked to the evolution of IT prices, with this evidence 
underlining the need for an extremely careful interpretation of growth 
accounting studies using data on WT services.  
 
 
Table 4 : Productivity in the US Wholesale Trade (WT) Industry 
























to  Prod’y 
Growth 









3.04 1.00 3.04  4.03 1.00 4.03  0.99 
DURABLES  4.84 0.46 2.24  5.94 0.48 2.86  0.62 
NON DURABLES   0.32 0.42 0.13  0.75 0.38 0.29  0.15 
ELECTRONIC 
MARKETS 




2.21 0.11 0.23  3.92 0.11 0.44  0.21 
FURNITURE  3.33 0.02 0.05  1.72 0.02 0.03  -0.03 
CONSTRUCTION  -2.11 0.02 -0.05  -0.36 0.02 -0.01  0.04 
COMMERCIAL 
EQUIPMENT 
13.08 0.07  0.97  13.78 0.08  1.13  0.15 
METALS  -0.31 0.05 -0.02  -0.41 0.04 -0.02  0.00 
ELECTRICAL  & 
ELECTRONIC 
8.81 0.06 0.50  12.98  0.07 0.93  0.43 
HARDWARE  2.70 0.02 0.04  2.50 0.02 0.04  0.00 
MACHINERY  2.75 0.08 0.22  2.97 0.08 0.24  0.02 
MISCELLANEOUS  2.43 0.04 0.09  3.24 0.04 0.13  0.04 
  Source: BLS and own calculations. The productivity measure is real output divided by total hours 
 
- In RT (table 5), two sub-sectors, electronics and appliance stores and non-
store retailers (with a large share of ICT equipment dealers) show high 
productivity growth rates. However, compared with WT, the productivity 
acceleration in RT is more widespread across the sub-sectors. It is difficult 
nevertheless to assess the extent to which the productivity acceleration in RT 
can be traced to the use of ICT. A recent paper by Sieling et al. (2001) traces 
the productivity improvements in various retail sectors to two developments, 
increased concentration in the industry and ICT investments29. In 1987, the 50 
largest retail firms accounted for 20% of all sales but by 1997 that proportion 
had grown to 26%. In the case of department stores, labour productivity 
                                                 
29 A typical ICT investment in retailing are point of sale systems (POS) which allow retailers to gather 
information which leads to improved inventory management. 
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growth partly reflects shifts away from conventional stores to discount or 
mass merchandising department stores. In 1987 the latter had a market share 
of 43% which increased significantly to 63% in 1997. With such a shift, 
productivity gains arise naturally because the latter are to a large extent self-
service stores30.  
 
Table 5 : Productivity in the US Retail Trade (RT) Industry 






















to  Prod’y 
Growth 







TOTAL RETAIL  1.91 1.00 1.91  3.79 1.00 3.79  1.88 
MOTOR 
VEHICLES 
1.15 0.25 0.28  1.74 0.26 0.46  0.18 
FURNITURE  3.06 0.03 0.10  3.84 0.03 0.11  0.01 
ELECTRONICS 
& APPLIANCES 
10.81 0.02  0.25  15.46 0.03  0.44  0.19 
BUILDING 
MATERIALS 
1.98 0.09 0.18  3.45 0.09 0.30  0.12 
FOOD  & 
BEVERAGES  
-0.86 0.20 -0.17  1.56 0.17  0.26  0.44 
HEALTH  / 
PERSONAL 
CARE 
0.74 0.04 0.03  3.61 0.05 0.16  0.13 
PETROL  2.16 0.08 0.17  2.76 0.08 0.22  0.05 
CLOTHING  4.21 0.06 0.27  4.62 0.06 0.26  0.00 
SPORTS  / 
HOBBIES 
2.80 0.02 0.07  5.66 0.03 0.15  0.08 
GENERAL 
MERCHANDISE 
3.18 0.12 0.39  4.96 0.13 0.65  0.26 
MISC 
RETAILERS 
3.62 0.03 0.10  3.26 0.03 0.11  0.01 
NON-STORE 
RETAILERS 
6.52 0.04 0.27 10.26  0.05 0.51  0.24 
  Source: BLS and own calculations. The productivity measure is real output divided by total hours 
 
Overall Assessment of ICT’s Contribution to Productivity Growth : Regarding 
the international / US regional comparison approach, the results on ICT production / 
diffusion effects suggest that ICT production rather than ICT-use is the dominant 
source of productivity growth and that the evidence of extraordinary spillover effects 
associated with ICT investment is still somewhat questionable31. Given the EU’s 
                                                 
30 The composition effect is especially visible with food stores. Grocery stores are by far the largest 
group within the food stores area. Here superstores and hypermarkets are replacing conventional 
grocery stores. In 1988 conventional grocery stores accounted for 43% of all consumer expenditures 
for food at home; by 1998, that proportion had fallen to 13%. The productivity improvements with car 
dealers can probably be traced to the increased use of computer diagnostic equipment. Productivity 
growth amongst the non-store retailers (catalogue and mail order houses) was increased by online 
sales. Based on annual retail trade data by the Census Bureau, E-commerce sales accounted for 0.5% 
of total retail sales in 1999, with 77% of these sales occurring in the non-store retailer industry group.  
 
31 In relative terms, these studies suggest that the ICT production / productivity link is more visible or 
clearcut compared with the ICT investment share / productivity link. In terms of the overall investment 
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relatively small ICT producing sector, especially on the manufacturing side, this 
raises important questions as to why the EU has failed to allocate sufficient resources 
to ICT production.  
 
Regarding the results from growth accounting studies and in particular the gains from 
ICT diffusion, a closer look at the productivity growth acceleration in the WT and RT 
industries in the US, which is commonly used as evidence in favour of positive TFP 
effects, also casts doubt on the robustness of the ICT investment / productivity link. 
One should bear in mind that the recent growth accounting studies do not attribute the 
productivity growth acceleration in the US relative to the EU to different speeds of 
ICT investment (i.e. ICT diffusion in a narrow sense) but to an increase in TFP in 
these industries (ICT diffusion in a broad sense). In WT, the measurement effect 
could explain a substantial part of the TFP acceleration in this industry32. In RT, 
while the effects are more dispersed, there are other factors beyond ICT which could 
account for the TFP acceleration in the US, such as larger store size, the increased 
share of self service markets and the greater entry of new establishments. It is 
difficult however to establish a clear causal ordering amongst these latter factors33.  
 
Finally, the above discussion on ICT diffusion effects must not be seen as 
contradicting the correct belief that ICT spillover effects are making a positive 
contribution to labour productivity growth, or that these gains may be larger in the US 
than in the EU because of institutional / regulatory constraints in a number of the 
EU’s Member States. It simply suggests that the US benefits are presently not as high 
as some commentators estimate when one correctly accounts for non-ICT drivers of 
productivity change and measurement issues.  ICT diffusion in the narrow sense of 
ICT capital deepening is clearly contributing strongly to productivity growth in both 
the US and the EU. The evidence for ICT diffusion in the broader sense of large TFP 
                                                                                                                                           
share (i.e. the investment to GDP ratio), ICT investments are evidently taking a higher proportion of 
overall investment but the belief that these new ICT investments are significantly more productivity-
enhancing compared with the non-ICT investments which they are replacing is simply not evident in 
the productivity figures of the countries shown earlier in Graph 15.  Consequently, while ICT 
investments are contributing strongly to productivity growth, this reflects their growing share in overall 
investment not that their relative contribution is spectacular.  This differs from the productivity gains 
being generated in ICT production, where the contribution to economy wide productivity growth is 
extraordinary relative to the contribution from non-ICT production. 
32 It is important to keep in mind that the mis-measurement of productivity in the US WT and RT 
industries is not translated onto the aggregate level. The combined productivity improvement in ICT 
production plus ICT diffusion is measured correctly, it is only the distribution of the productivity gains 
across production and diffusion which is questionable. In this context, the present analysis suggests 
that the contribution from the ICT production side to the acceleration in US labour productivity growth 
has been underestimated in a lot of the most recent growth accounting studies.  In other words while 
the size of the EU-US productivity growth gap is still the same, less of this gap is due to the US’s 
performance in ICT-using industries such as WT and RT and more of it is located in semiconductors 
and other ICT-producing industries.   
33 These different TFP effects are especially surprising since the employment changes in the retail and 
wholesale trade industries in the US and the EU have been very similar over the second half of the 
1990’s and consequently the TFP gains in the US are not coming from a sharp reduction in the 
numbers employed in these industries.  Such a reduction in employment is often the source of the 
efficiency gains associated with the introduction of new technology or from the liberalisation of 
previously state-owned industries.     
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gains in specific ICT-using industries is still however open to some debate.  While it 
is undeniable that given the pervasiveness of ICT in developed economies that there 
are TFP gains related to the use of this general purpose technology, the present 
section has simply questioned the spectacular nature of those gains in a small number 




1. ICT PRODUCTION EFFECT
ASSESSMENT OF ICT’s CONTRIBUTION TO PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
(3 Main Transmission Channels)
CONTRIBUTION FROM ICT PRODUCTION IS
UNDERESTIMATED IN MANY STUDIES. WHEN
MEASUREMENT ISSUES ARE CORRECTLY
ALLOWED FOR, A HIGHER PROPORTION OF THE
POST-1991 ACCELERATION IN US PRODUCTIVITY
IS LINKED WITH ICT PRODUCTION
2. ICT INVESTMENT EFFECTS
(DIFFUSION IN THE NARROW SENSE)
ICT CAPITAL DEEPENING IS CONTRIBUTING
STRONGLY TO PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN BOTH
THE US AND THE EU. WHILE ICT INVESTMENTS
ARE CONTRIBUTING MORE AT THE TOTAL
ECONOMY LEVEL IN THE US, DiFFERENCES FOR
THE RETAIL AND WHOLESALE TRADE
INDUSTRIES ARE SMALL.
3. ICT SPILLOVER EFFECTS
(DIFFUSION IN THE WIDER SENSE)
EVIDENCE THAT ICT INVESTMENTS ARE GENERATING LARGE
PRODUCTIVITY GAINS IN A RANGE OF INTENSIVE ICT-USING
INDUSTRIES IS STILL NOT CONCLUSIVE. IN THE CASE OF THE
TFP PERFORMANCE OF THE US RETAIL AND WHOLESALE
TRADE INDUSTRIES, WHEN ONE ACCOUNTS FOR THE NON-ICT
DRIVERS OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND MEASUREMENT
ISSUES, THE GAINS ARE MUCH LESS IMPRESSIVE THAN SOME
STUDIES SUGGEST.
 
                                                 
34 There is a final point which casts some additional doubt on the growth accounting studies. The 
strong productivity contribution of RT and WT is due to an extraordinary productivity acceleration 
(from 2.3% to 7.2% in WT and from 2.5 to 6.6 in RT) in the US. The data used are from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). Using a different data source, namely data from the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics (BLS), which is the source used in the present study, yields dramatically different 
productivity growth accelerations in the US (from 3% to 4% in WT and from 1.9% to 3.8% in RT).   
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4 : Enhancing the EU’s productivity performance : Focussing on The Production 




The analysis in section 3 on the contribution to overall productivity growth from ICT 
production / ICT use has indicated a more general theme, namely the importance to 
the EU’s future productivity performance of an ongoing process of structural change 
aimed at boosting the production and absorption of new, more knowledge intensive, 
technologies. The relative success of this whole process hinges ultimately on the 
extent to which the Lisbon Strategy’s objective of creating a more knowledge-driven 
economic model is realised over the coming years and decades and in particular on 
the ability of governments to create an environment in which the EU’s innovation 
infrastructure (R&D expenditure, research personnel)35 can generate the new skills, 
ideas and products needed to compete successfully in the global marketplace. 
Excellence in the knowledge production sector and the creation of a more effective 
absorption / diffusion process in the EU will be driven not only by the innovation 
infrastructure but by a complex range of factors, with macroeconomic fundamentals 
(low and stable inflation; moderate tax burdens on labour and capital; trade 
openness); the physical / human capital investment activities of firms, households and 
the government; firm dynamics36 and competition37 all playing important and 
interlinking roles in shaping the overall productivity environment. 
                                                 
35 A country’s innovation infrastructure is made up of a network of publicly funded research institutes 
/ 3
rd level education establishments allied to the research activities of small and large private sector 
firms, all of which contribute to an economy’s knowledge creation process. 
36 Firm level analyses look at the micro determinants of growth and focus on the reallocation of 
resources within specific industries, emanating from the expansion of more productive firms, the entry 
of new players and the exiting of relatively inefficient ones.  According to the OECD’s firm level 
analysis, a key finding is that “a large fraction of aggregate labour productivity growth is driven by 
what happens in each individual firm, whilst shifts in market shares from low to high productivity 
firms seem to play only a modest role”. The OECD’s analysis also points to a healthy process of 
“creative destruction” in OECD countries, with the failure rate of new small entrants being particularly 
high, suggesting a large degree of market experimentation. This process of creative destruction should 
be encouraged by easing the regulatory burden on the start-up of new firms and on the development of 
fast growing firms. These firms contribute to productivity growth in a number of different ways, with 
new start-ups directly contributing when their degree of efficiency is higher compared with exiting 
firms. In addition, new and fast growing firms which pose a credible threat to the position of 
incumbent firms can force the latter to respond by raising their own productivity. Greater 
experimentation by highly innovative firms is particularly important in periods of rapid technological 
change, with new ideas and methods of production boosting the innovation process and leading to 
faster rates of adoption of new productivity enhancing technologies. 
37 Innovation directly results from greater competition and is increasingly being used by firms to drive 
their competitive strategies. However, there is a complicated non-linear relationship between 
innovation and competition with the recent research literature suggesting that it takes the form of an 
inverse U i.e. competition is positive for innovation but only up to a certain point. This research 
underlines the need to take industry-specific circumstances into account when assessing the precise 
relationship between competition and productivity. At the private sector level, innovation directly 
contributes to the productivity of firms and via spillover effects it impacts on the productivity of other 
firms and even other countries.  These spillover effects enable firms to add to their own innovation 
capacity by absorbing knowledge produced elsewhere, be it domestic or foreign sourced. 
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In this context, the earlier Economic Paper38 on productivity described how ECFIN’s 
productivity model could be used to look at the channels via which the more 
fundamental factors driving growth affected investment and total factor productivity 
(TFP) and how these factors interacted to generate labour productivity growth. Using 
this model, the analysis showed that EU-US productivity differentials could in fact be 
related to some fundamental structural differences at the individual country level. 
According to this analysis, there are five areas which are both quantitatively 
important for productivity and relevant in an EU policy making context. These are the 
regulatory burden; the structure of financial markets (bank based versus more market 
based financial systems); differences in the degree of product / service market 
integration (especially in terms of entry and exit rules and overall competition levels); 
ageing of the labour force; and finally the focus of the present section, the knowledge 
economy. These are the areas where the EU either compares poorly with the 
equivalent conditions prevailing in the best performing OECD countries or, in the 
case of ageing, where the EU is facing a more severe medium to long run challenge. 
While the present section focuses on the EU’s knowledge economy problems, this 
particular productivity driver cannot be seen in isolation from the other weaknesses 
highlighted in the 2004 analysis or from the wider economic and regulatory 




4.1 : Why the knowledge Economy must be a central element of any EU 
productivity agenda ? : Given the EU’s knowledge economy ambitions, evidence is 
presented in the present section which suggests that the US has a superior knowledge 
creation and absorption system, with particular features of the EU’s innovation model 
needing to be urgently re-assessed.  As the text makes clear, it is not just an issue of 
increasing R&D and tertiary education spending to US levels, its more a matter of the 
framework conditions / flanking policies needed to provide adequate incentive 
structures for the private sector to enhance productivity, with well functioning 
product, labour and capital markets a clear priority in this respect.  Given the 
structural nature of Europe’s productivity problem and the fact that the trend is 
continuing to deteriorate, a key objective for the forthcoming mid-term review of the 
Lisbon strategy must be to embolden national leaders to the absolute necessity for 
action in this area. Arresting the present decline in productivity growth rates and 
realising the EU’s stated objective of creating a globally competitive, knowledge-
based, economy, will require a number of essential reforms.  
 
 
Knowledge Investments and their Economic Significance : With the striking 
impact of ICT, there has been considerable interest in analysing the effects of 
investments in knowledge and human capital formation. The empirical growth 
literature emphasises knowledge and the creation of knowledge via the investment 
activities of firms, households and the government in both R&D and education as 
                                                 
38 No.208, op.cit. 
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significant drivers for enhancing the level of technology (total factor productivity). 
Last years Economic Paper39 indicated the relative potency of knowledge investments  
(R&D and education) in determining long run productivity growth rates, with a 
simulation indicating that a combination of regulatory reform and a substantial 
increase in EU knowledge production could boost EU potential growth rates by 
between ½ to ¾ of a percentage point annually over a 5-10 year horizon40. Regarding 
the US, the knowledge based economy would appear to be more fully entrenched, 
with Graph 16 suggesting that investments in R&D41 and education can explain 
nearly 75% of the US productivity growth rate over the period 1950-200342 and with 
the more recent decades accelerating its dependence on more knowledge intensive 
forms of investment, such as ICT. According to Jones (2002), the US’s average 
labour productivity growth rate of 2-2¼% over this period could only have been 
generated via a (permanent) shift of resources into knowledge production activities 
and that without such investments US labour productivity growth would have 
averaged only 1/3 of a % point over this period. In other words, over the longer run, 
these knowledge investments are the key drivers of productivity growth in advanced 









                                                 
39 No. 208, op.cit. 
40 While a ½-¾ of a % point would undoubtedly represent a significant turnaround in the EU’s present 
economic fortunes, given the extent of the present gap in performance, this package of reforms would 
still not be sufficient for the EU to overtake the US in productivity terms over the timescale laid out for 
the Lisbon agenda. Apart from the time which will need to elapse between the implementation of 
reforms to the appearance of visible effects, there are two further obstacles to be overcome in reaching 
the Lisbon-imposed productivity target, firstly the temporary productivity trade-off in attaining the 
parallel employment target of 70 per cent and secondly the continuous drag on productivity induced by 
Europe’s ageing labour force. 
41 Innovation is one of the main drivers of productivity growth, with Graph 16 indicating that by itself 
it has been responsible for over 40% of US labour productivity growth over the last half century. 
42 The contributions to productivity growth in the Jones analysis (Graph 16) are calculated by 
multiplying historical changes (from 1950 to 2003) of R&D, education and capital shares with their 
respective output elasticities. The relatively small contribution of physical capital to growth is due to 
the fact that unlike the shares of R&D and educational attainment, the share of physical capital has not 
changed much over the last 50 years. This is typical of a country (such as the US) at the technology 
frontier, with steady state physical investment levels and where physical capital accumulation becomes 
a smaller part of the overall productivity performance. For countries however in the “catching-up” 
phase of their economic development, the productivity contribution attributed to physical investments 
would be substantially larger. The contribution of population to productivity growth in the Jones 
analysis comes from an increasing returns to scale effect in production. The basic point of the graph is 
that since the EU15 is now close to the technology frontier, with steady state physical investment 
levels, any additional productivity gains over the coming decades are more likely to be generated from 
a boost to knowledge investments rather than from changes to our present physical investment to GDP 
ratio. 





Graph 16 : Determinants of US Labour Productivity Growth  











Source : Jones (2002) and own calculations 
 
ICT is a striking example of the importance of knowledge investments  :  As 
shown in section 3, individual knowledge intensive sectors such as ICT are now 
crucial to the overall productivity performances of individual countries. But its role 
extends well beyond its direct contribution as a high-growth sector. ICT in fact is a 
very good example of the growth in importance of more knowledge intensive forms 
of investment, with its share of total investment growing steadily over the last 15-20 
years, having now reached 1/3 of overall non-residential gross fixed capital formation 
in the US. Within the ICT sector, specific industries such as semiconductors now 
have overall knowledge investment budgets which are equal in size to their spending 
on physical investments such as plant and machinery and buildings. Furthermore ICT 
investment itself has not only a larger than average “knowledge” content, in the form 
of the software and R&D spending needed to generate it, but has an additional 
knowledge element in that it is also complementary to skilled labour.  
 
Given ICT’s status as a high productivity growth industry and at the same time its 
potential as a “general purpose technology”, inciting productivity growth in ICT-
using industries, it should be a concern to policy makers that the US has established, 
and is retaining, a large global advantage in this pivotal industry43. How have the 
Americans achieved such a dominant position and why have other industrialized 
countries failed so far to catch up to the technology frontier ?  With the US continuing 
to reap enormous gains from its dominance of the global ICT industry, Europe should 
be looking at those factors which have allowed this industry to flourish in the US.  
Box 2 explores the mix between knowledge investment, government support and 
                                                 
43 The link between diffusion and production may actually not be coincidental : being strong in ICT 
production might also give a nation an advantage in being faster and/or better in adopting the new 
technology.   
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market structure that lay behind the US’s success in the ICT area and some of the 
historical reasons why Europe stayed behind.   
 
An important question arising from the analysis in Box 2 is the extent to which the 
example of ICT will be replicated in future high tech industries.  If this is a credible 
risk then the key issue is whether the EU has specific problems in relation to its 
innovation infrastructure (i.e. in terms of the resources devoted to innovation) and 
whether the US has specific features / framework conditions such as the linkages 
between the various actors in the system etc which make it more likely to be the 
location of any future breakthroughs in technology. This is a pertinent question if one 
accepts the contention of Gordon (2004), amongst others, that the US’s lead in ICT is 
not an isolated case. The US holds a comparative or absolute advantage not only in 
computer hardware, but more broadly in software and in other general purpose 
technologies, like its initial leadership in the electricity industry and in its exploitation 
of the internal combustion engine (Gordon 2004). While some comfort can be taken 
from the EU’s ability in the past to catch up with the US in the latter technologies, 
this did not occur without a large restructuring and refocusing of EU industry. In 
addition, the wider issue is why is it that the US seems to be systematically better in 
creating and exploiting new (general purpose) technologies ? This requires 
broadening the discussion beyond ICT to consider why the US seems to have a better 
innovation capacity than the EU. 
 
4.2 : Evidence that the US has a superior innovation model in terms of Knowledge 
Creation and Absorption  :  While traditional growth theories explain differences in 
growth across countries by the expansion in inputs, such as capital and labour, and by 
the catching-up of countries with lower productivity, modern theories emphasize 
research inputs and human capital as the key drivers for long-run growth.  They stress 
not only the importance of “own” innovation but also the capacity to imitate and to 
absorb externally available know-how. Institutional factors and framework conditions 
are seen as an important part of the “innovative system” in which innovative firms 
operate.   
 
National Innovation Systems and the National Innovation Capacity :  Using the 
macroeconomic insights from neo-classical and endogenous growth theory, as well as 
the ideas from the literature on “National Innovation Systems”, applied economic 
theorists (e.g. Stern, Furman & Porter 2002) have synthesized what determines an 
economy’s “national innovation capacity” defined as the ability of a nation to not 
only produce new ideas but also to commercialize a flow of innovative technologies 
over the longer term (see Table 6).  From this perspective a range of factors are 
deemed to be important for an effective innovation effort : 
 
o  1. Overall Innovation Infrastructure : A sufficiently developed ‘supply’ side of 
R&D (as reflected in the amount of R&D carried out or the number of skilled 
researchers) is a necessary but insufficient condition for successful innovation.  
 
o  2. Essential Framework Conditions / Flanking Policies : Broader framework 
conditions are important as well, including a sufficient ‘demand’ for innovation to 
reward successful innovators. This requires sophisticated lead users willing to pay 
for innovations, effective intellectual property rights (IPR) schemes, a favourable 
macro-economic environment and effective competition in output markets.  
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o  3. Interconnectedness of the Overall Innovation System : Perhaps the most 
critical element in the framework is the interconnectedness of the agents in the 
system, linking the common innovation infrastructure to specific technology 
clusters. Through networking amongst firms, researchers and governments, the 
supply of new ideas diffuses throughout the economy. This requires good 
industry-science links and well functioning capital and labour markets, such that 
the human and financial capital inputs get allocated to their most efficient 
applications.  
Table  6 : National Innovation Capacity :  An Integrated Framework 
 
1a : Existing Stock of Technological Know-how 
 
1b : Supporting Basic Research and Higher Education 
 
1. Common Innovation Infrastructure : 
Interlinked institutions, resources and 
policies 
  1c : Overall Science and Technology Policy 
 
2a : Technology specific know-how : specialized R&D 
personnel 
2b : Incentives for innovation : lead users, appropriate 
IPR systems and output market competition : local 
rivalry, openness  
 
 





2c : Presence of related / supporting industries 
(clusters) 
 
3a : Industry-Science relationships 
 
3. Quality of Links between clusters & 
common factors    
3b : Efficient labour & capital markets 
Source : Based on Stern et al. (2000) 
 
National Innovative Capacity and the Crucial Importance of Market Entry and 
Exit Rules : As highlighted in Box 2 in relation to the specific example of the ICT 
industry and strikingly indicated below in Table 7, a country’s innovative capacity is 
strongly linked to market conditions and especially market entry and exit rules.   
According to Baumol (2004), private sector innovations44 in the US come from two 
distinct sources, firstly from the activities of large firms and secondly from the efforts 
of independent inventors and their entrepreneurial partners. Baumol asserts that the 
active presence of both groups enhances the overall innovation process since their 
activities are complementary, with the independent inventors / entrepreneurs 
specialising in breakthrough innovations and with the R&D departments of the larger 
firms enhancing these breakthroughs and adding to their overall usefulness. Baumol 
concludes by saying that “it is fortunate for the US economy that its institutions and 
arrangements are such as to facilitate and stimulate the profuse formation of small 
firms and to encourage their more radical innovative contributions”. There is 
increasing evidence to support Baumol’s view that more competition may well drive 
                                                 
44 Due to market failures in the form of abuses of market power or the need to ensure a socially 
optimal level of human capital and R&D investment (due to the positive externalities associated with 
these determinants), governments are also big players in the innovation process. 
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up the rate of technological and organisational innovation. Firms enjoying significant 
market power do not appear to plough back excess profits into higher rates of R&D 
and innovation. Rather the lack of competition tends to provide little incentive for 
firms to pursue technological innovations, slows down its diffusion and impedes a 
higher variety and quality of goods and services being delivered to consumers45. 
 
Table 7. Some Important Innovations by U.S. Small Firms  
in the Twentieth Century 
Air Conditioning      Heart Valve        Portable Computer 
Air Passenger Service     Heat Sensor        Prestressed Concrete 
Airplane     Helicopter      Prefabricated  Housing 
Articulated Tractor Chassis   High Resolution CAT Scanner  Pressure Sensitive Tape 
Artificial Skin       High Resolution Digital X-Ray   Human Growth Hormone 
Assembly Line       High Resolution Microscope   Programmable Computer 
Audio  Tape  Recorder     Microscope      Quick-Frozen  Food 
Biomagnetic Imaging     Hydraulic Brake      Rotary Oil Drilling Bit 
Biosynthetic Insulin     Integrated Circuit Board    Safety Razor 
Catalytic Petroleum Cracking   Kidney Stone Laser     Six-Axis Robot Arm 
Polaroid  Camera    Large  Computer      Soft  Contact  Lens 
Defibrillator    Microprocessor      Supercomputer 
DNA Fingerprinting    Magnetic Resonance Scanner   Two-Armed Mobile Robot 
Electronic Spreadsheet     Optical  Scanner      Vacuum  Tube 
Freewing Aircraft     Outboard Engine      Variable Output Transformer 
FM  Radio    Pacemaker    Vascular  Lesion  Laser 
Front-End  Loader    Personal  Computer   Xerography 
Gyrocompass    Photo  Typesetting  X-Ray  Telescope 
Source : US Small Business Administration (1995) / Baumol (2004) 
 
 
4.2.1 : Overview of Innovation Infrastructures in the EU and the US :  Graphs 17-
19 provide a short graphical overview of the basic differences in the overall 
innovation infrastructures of the EU and the US. 
 
o  Human Resources in R&D : The US employs nearly 300000 more researchers 
compared with the EU, with the vast majority of the overall total (over 80%) 
employed in the business sector, compared with less than 50% in the EU.  
 
 
                                                 
45 In terms of policy, while the general prescription clearly supports the case for greater competition, 
differences in the interplay between competition, innovation and productivity also suggests that for a 
number of individual industries, allowance must be made for specific market characteristics. For 
example, industry-specific framework conditions (i.e. incentive structures) are needed in markets 
characterised by network externalities or economies of scale where innovation tends to be stifled by 
cut-throat competition. Increasing dynamic efficiency in these industries may be better promoted via 
pre-competitive cooperation agreements between firms in the form of research joint ventures. While 
the results of the OECD’s growth project (2004) showed that aggregate labour productivity growth is 
mainly driven by what happens in existing companies, entry and exit rules still play an important role 
in boosting productivity. 
 
 




Graph 17 : Number of Researchers : Breakdown into Business, Government and 



























Source : OECD 
 
o  Basic R&D Expenditure Differences at the Economy-Wide Level  :  A 
persistent and growing differential exists in the amount of resources devoted to 
R&D in the EU and the US both in terms of the overall research intensity of the 
respective economies (1.9% versus 2.8% of GDP) and in absolute amounts.  To 
put the respective research efforts into context, the absolute gap in the volume of 
research is roughly $110 billion.  If one widens the definition of the knowledge 
economy to also include expenditure on the higher education sector, the US is 
investing well over $200 billion more annually on its knowledge economy 
compared with the EU. 
 
Graph 18 : R&D Intensity of EU and US Economies  
(% of GDP + Absolute Amount) 
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Source : OECD 
 
o  Basic R&D Expenditure Differences at the Sectoral Level : Compared with the 
EU, a much larger share of US R&D is carried out by the business, as opposed to 
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the government, sector. Within the business sector, the US spends substantially 
more on services compared with the EU, especially in the “Computer and Related 
Activities” area. Of the total US R&D effort, roughly 1/3 is devoted to services 
and 2/3 to manufacturing. Regarding the EU, its research efforts continue to be 
overwhelmingly focussed on the manufacturing sector which presently accounts 
for around 85% of its overall business sector R&D spending. 
 
Graph 19 : Business Sector R&D (+Focus on Services R&D)  


























Source : OECD 
 
 
Basic R&D Expenditure Differences at the Industry Level (Technology Specific 
R&D) : Since no reliable comparative figures exist for a breakdown of service sector 
R&D activities, the industry level comparison is restricted to the manufacturing 
sector.  Of the 27 industries which make up the manufacturing sector in the present 
study (see Graph 11), only 8 can be regarded as having an above average R&D 
intensity and therefore classified as high technology industries46. The details 
regarding these 8 industries and their aggregation into the two categories of ICT and 
non-ICT is given in Tables 8/8a-c below, with some supplementary information given 





                                                 
46 A high technology industry is defined as one with an above average R&D intensity (i.e. a high share 
of its output is devoted to R&D activities). Whether an industry is R&D intensive or not is highly 
technology specific and hence very similar across the EU and the US.  Nevertheless it is interesting to 
note the relative differences across the two regions, which also applies over time, and which reflects 
the particular national specialisations. For example, while the 6 most knowledge intensive industries in 
the EU and the US are the same, the relative ranking differs. For the EU the ranking is 1.Telecom, 
2.Aircraft and Spacecraft, 3.Office Machinery, 4.Chemicals, 5.Motor Vehicles and 6.Instruments.  For 
the US, in relative terms Office Machinery is the most R&D intensive sector, following by 2.Aircraft 
and Spacecraft, 3.Instruments, 4.Telecom, 5 Motor Vehicles and 6.Chemicals.  
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Gap in R&D Spending
EU-US* 


































(ICT)  (19765) 
 
(21670)  (35782) 
 
(52721)  (0.552) (0.411) 
(Non- ICT)  (38633) 
 
(46755)  (49366) 
 
(57489)  (0.783) (0.813) 
* This gap is calculated by dividing the EU figure with that of the US 
Source : On the basis of OECD (Anberd Databank) 
 
 
Table 8a : Shares of Some Specific R&D Intensive Manufacturing Industries in 
total R&D Spending of the Manufacturing Sector (Period Average 1996-1999) 
 
% SHARE OF TOTAL 
MANUFACTURING R&D 
 
























































 Source : On the basis of OECD (Anberd Databank) 
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Table 8b : Shares of Some Member States in total EU-15 R&D Spending of the 
Manufacturing Sector (Period Averages 1992-1995 and 1996-1999) 
% SHARE OF TOTAL EU- 
MANUFACTURING R&D 
% SHARE OF TOTAL EU- 
MANUFACTURING R&D 











(FRANCE)  (22%) (20%) 
(GERMANY)  (37%) (36%) 
(ITALY)  (8%) (7%) 





















Source : On the basis of OECD (Anberd Databank) 
 
Table 8c : Shares of R&D Intensive Manufacturing Industries in total R&D 
Spending of the Manufacturing Sector for the US and some EU-15 Member 
States (Period Average 1992-1995 and 1996-1999) 
% SHARE OF TOTAL 
MANUFACTURING 
R&D IN  
HIGH-TECH  
 





% SHARE OF TOTAL 
MANUFACTURING 












































(FRANCE)  (93%) (86%) (61%) (56%) (32%) (30%) 
(GERMANY)  (91%) (91%) (62%) (67%) (29%) (24%) 
(ITALY)  (89%) (90%) (54%) (56%) (35%) (34%) 





















































Source : On the basis of OECD (Anberd Databank) 
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The key points from Tables 8/8a-c and Graph 20 are as follows : 
 
o  Firstly, in terms of absolute expenditures, the US retains a sizeable advantage 
over the EU in terms of overall R&D spending. Furthermore, this gap has 
increased over the nineties.  This gap is somewhat smaller when looking at 
manufacturing R&D only, since the US is concentrating a higher proportion of its 
R&D spending on the services sector compared with the EU. Nevertheless, even 
in manufacturing a serious and expanding gap in R&D spending remains.  This 
gap is particularly high in the ICT sector and is growing over time.  In the non-
ICT high-tech sectors,  the gap is smaller and closing, but there is still a gap.  
 
o  Secondly, the EU’s R&D expenditures are not focussed on the best industries 
from a high productivity growth rate perspective.  The ideal combination would 
appear to be industries, such as ICT, which combine both high technology (i.e. 
above average R&D intensities) and high productivity growth rate 
characteristics47. While one cannot exclude the possibility that there have been 
other similar “dual” technologies in the past, it is fairly safe to conclude, in terms 
of the size of the overall growth rate effect, that the ICT manufacturing industry is 
remarkable and possibly unique. From this perspective, it is disturbing to note 
from Table 8 and 8a that the US totally dominates the EU in terms of its research 
efforts in this area, particularly in office equipment, and that this dominance has 
continued to grow over time. Compared to the US, the EU’s R&D expenditures in 
manufacturing are more concentrated on chemicals and motor vehicles, which are 
not particularly high-growth areas within the overall high-tech sector.   
 
o  Thirdly, given that the productivity enhancing characteristics of ICT were already 
known in the first half of the 1990’s, what is particularly significant from table 8 
is the fact that the US’s dominance in ICT manufacturing was not seriously 
challenged over the second half of the 1990’s.  In fact the US increased its 
advantage significantly over this period48, with the EU gap in R&D spending 
increasing from $16 billion in the first half of the nineties to $31 billion in the 
second half. Over this period, the EU instead extended its specialisation in the 
relatively low productivity growth, non-ICT, manufacturing industries which 
contributed only 1/20
th of the productivity gains achieved by the US from ICT. 
This is an important point to bear in mind in the context of the Lisbon strategy’s 
objective of an increase in the EU’s R&D intensity from 2% to 3% over the 
coming years.  On the basis of the above analysis, if this target had been set in 
                                                 
47 This distinction is important for understanding the significance of ICT. For example, the most R&D 
intensive industry is aerospace (40% of its output is spent on R&D), with ICT in second place (25% of 
its output is devoted to knowledge production). Since all R&D intensive industries tend to have high 
levels of labour productivity (linked to the high skill levels of the research personnel employed in these 
industries), what distinguishes the ICT producing industries is that they are also high productivity 
growth rate industries, due to the TFP-enhancing effects of Moore’s law which is largely exogenous to 
the labour input. Consequently while specific ICT producing industries may be less knowledge 
intensive than aerospace, they nevertheless have a much higher productivity growth rate due to this 
TFP effect. In fact ICT is one of the few large industries in history to combine these two features of 
having both a very high productivity level (due to its R&D intensity) and a high productivity growth 
rate.   
48 The US’s absolute increase in its ICT R&D investments was roughly nine times greater than the 
equivalent increase for the EU. 
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1990 for attainment in 2000, without any specific sectoral focus, and if the EU 
continued to invest heavily in the more traditional high technology industries such 
as cars and chemicals (which it actually did do), it would have gained relatively 
little in terms of closing the productivity gap with the US. A sizeable productivity 
effect from the additional expenditure would have necessitated a shift in focus to 
the newer, high technology, industries such as ICT.   
 
o  Fourthly, Graph 20 confirms the broad trends from tables 8/8a, indicating on the 
basis of the R&D expenditures of the top 300 international firms in each 
individual sector that while the EU may be dominant in low productivity growth, 
high technology, industries such as cars and chemicals, the US is dominant in the 
high productivity / high technology areas of IT hardware and electronics. This US 
dominance is already worryingly been extended to software and computer 
services. Graph 20 further allows one to single out pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology from the rest of the chemicals sector. It is again a source of 
concern to see in the pharma/biotech part that the US is leading in terms of R&D 
expenditures. Within the chemicals sector, an area of traditional strength for the 
EU, pharma/biotech is arguably the key productivity growth component for the 
future. 
 
o  Finally, as tables 8b-c show, the picture for the EU-15 is strongly determined by 
the big countries: France, Italy, Germany, and the UK.  For these countries, the 
share of total manufacturing R&D in the high growth ICT sectors is much smaller 
than in the US and decreasing over time. France and Italy have a share in ICT, 
which is above the EU average, but still considerably below the US share. All 
these countries show a stronger concentration of their manufacturing R&D in the 
non-ICT high-tech sectors. For Germany, this concentration is in the motor 
vehicles sector (with 27% of total manufacturing R&D in the second half of the 
1990s versus only 13% in the US).  For the UK, this concentration is in the 
pharmaceuticals sector, which is one of the other high growth opportunity sectors 
in the high-tech area (27% of total manufacturing R&D in the second half of the 
1990s versus only 9.5% in the US). The comparison over time shows little 
change, even strengthening the specialisation away from ICT in the big countries. 
Amongst the smaller Member States, the Netherlands and especially Finland have 
shares of high-growth ICT sectors which are above the EU-average share and 
which are close to, or even above, that of the US49.  Both of these countries have 
increased their specialization in R&D spending over time into the high-growth 
ICT sectors.   Unfortunately the share of these smaller countries in the total R&D 
expenditures of the EU as a whole is too small to influence the average EU 
pattern.  
 
Assessment : The most significant issue posed by the above analysis is not so much 
the differences in the amounts of resources devoted to the knowledge production 
sector, but the EU’s systemic failure (especially in the larger Member States) to 
refocus its R&D activities over the 1990’s, firstly on established high productivity 
growth industries such as ICT; and secondly on potentially high productivity growth 
industries in the pharma/biotech area and perhaps also in a number of service 
                                                 
49 Ireland, which is not reported because of its very small share of total EU manufacturing R&D 
(0.7%), also has a high concentration in ICT (>50%).   
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industries (software and computer related services). A host of factors could be 
explaining the superior US performance e.g. closer links between the main actors in 
the US innovation system; better framework conditions; healthier “creative 
destruction” and market experimentation processes in the US which have proved vital 
to the development of a range of new, high tech, industries in the ICT producing and 
ICT using areas. While all of these factors are potentially playing a role, it is 
unfortunately not possible to assess the contribution of the US’s superior innovation 
capacity to differences in EU-US productivity trends at the total economy level. 
However, a tentative assessment can be made for the manufacturing sector on the 
basis of the earlier analysis of R&D spending in this sector. Since this analysis 
underlined the dominance of the US’s innovation model, it constitutes a prime 
candidate for explaining EU-US differences in the productivity growth performances 
of their respective manufacturing industries. This is what is attempted in 4.2.2. 
 
Graph 20 : R&D Expenditures by the Top 300 international firms by Industry : 
EU15 V US (2002) 
Cars
Pharma + Biotech




Software + Computer Services
0 1 02 03 04 05 -10 -20
Billions of PPS Dollars
0
EU US GAP
Source : DG Research 
 
4.2.2. : Can the Superiority of the US’s Innovation Infrastructure Explain EU-
US Productivity Growth Differentials in the Manufacturing Sector  :  To what 
extent can differences in EU-US productivity growth rates be linked to differences in 
the innovation capacities of both areas. Beyond the higher expenditures on 
manufacturing R&D, particularly in the high productivity growth ICT industries, 
various links can be made at the industry level which can contribute towards 
explaining the productivity gap through R&D expenditures. In this context, two key 
issues are : 
 
•  Firstly, has the US economy specialized more in specific high technology 
industries which are also the high-productivity growth areas – in other words are 
the EU-US productivity growth differentials linked to industry specialisation in 
high-tech industries ?   
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•  Secondly, within each industry, beyond the effect of differences in spending 
levels, is the US getting a higher rate of productivity growth from its R&D 
spending i.e. a better leverage out of its R&D into productivity growth which can 
roughly be equated with a higher rate of return on its R&D expenditures.   
 
While our analysis of these two issues, and of their role in explaining the link 
between R&D spending and EU-US productivity growth differentials, is still in its 
infancy, a number of interesting conclusions are already emerging : 
 
o  Firstly, as shown earlier in section 3, there are large EU-US differences in terms 
of specialisation (i.e. differences in the size of specific industries as a share of 
total output). Within the overall high technology sector, it is clear from Table 9a 
that the US is especially concentrated/specialized in ICT manufacturing, with 
nearly 15% of total US manufacturing output coming from these ICT industries 
compared with only 6% for the EU. In the non-ICT area, there are no differences 
between the EU and the US, with the high technology industries representing 
around 34% of the overall manufacturing output of both areas. 
   
Table 9a : Percentage Shares of High Technology Industries in the total output 
of the Manufacturing Sector (Current Prices) 
EU  US  Specialisation  Gap 
Indicator * 
 
























(ICT)  (6.2) (6.3)  (13.8)  (14.9)  (0.448)  (0.419) 
(NON-ICT)  (33.1) (34.0) (33.8) (33.8)  (0.979)  (1.005) 
*Calculated by dividing the EU figure by the US figure for the respective periods, with a value of less 
than 1 indicating that the US is relatively more specialised in a particular sector or industry, with a 
value in excess of 1 showing the same for the EU.  A value of around 1 suggests broad balance. 
Source : Own calculations 
 
o  Secondly, since amongst the high technology industries as a whole, it is ICT 
which has been shown to have the highest opportunity for productivity growth, it 
is not surprising to find in Table 9b that the US’s specialization in these 
industries, and their realization of a high productivity performance, is a key factor 
in explaining overall EU-US productivity growth differences. In fact the ICT 
industry totally explains the better performance of the US’s manufacturing sector 
over the 1990’s compared with that of the EU’s and it contributes nearly four 
times more to the US’s, economy-wide, productivity growth rate compared with 
the equivalent sector in the EU. Not only is the productivity gap substantial, there 
is no evidence of significant catching-up after 199550.  
                                                 
50 Regarding the non-ICT, high-technology, sector the picture looks different, with the EU getting a 
higher contribution to productivity growth from these industries as compared to the US, especially in 
the second part of the 1990’s. Unfortunately, these industries represent much smaller opportunities for 
productivity growth as compared to the ICT sectors. 
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Table 9b : Contribution to growth in productivity from High Technology 
Manufacturing Industries (% Points)* 




























ICT  0.137 0.219 0.603 0.802  0.23  0.27 
NON-ICT  0.262 0.132 0.227 0.047  1.15  2.81 
*Calculated by dividing the EU figure by the US figure for the respective periods, with a value of less 
than 1 indicating that the US is relatively more specialised in a particular sector or industry, with a 
value in excess of 1 showing the same for the EU.  A value of around 1 suggests broad balance. 
Source : Own calculations 
 
o  Thirdly, Table 9c presents evidence of EU-US differences regarding “rates of 
return” from R&D investments.  For specific high-tech manufacturing 
industries, the gap in productivity growth is considerably higher than the gap 
in R&D spending, implying a lower rate of return from R&D spending in 
high-tech industries in the EU compared with the US.  This is entirely due to 
the ICT high-technology industries51. 
 
Table 9c : Comparison of EU-US Differences in R&D Rates of Return 
EU-US Gap in R&D 
Spending 




1991-1995 1996-2000 1991-1995 1996-2000 
TOTAL HIGH TECHNOLOGY 
MANUFACTURING  SECTOR* 
0.68 0.62 0.48 0.41 
(ICT)  0.55 0.41 0.23 0.27 
(NON-ICT)  0.78 0.81 1.15 2.81 
Source : Own calculations 
 
Overall Assessment of the EU’s Innovation Infrastructure in the High 
Technology Manufacturing Sector : Taking all the caveats in mind of the basic 
analysis presented, the evidence for the manufacturing sector supports the importance 
of differences in the innovation system in explaining diverging EU-US productivity 
growth rates. Within high-technology industries, the specific role of ICT cannot be 
ignored. ICT producing industries have the highest productivity growth rates in all of 
manufacturing (in fact in the total economy). The US is more specialized in these ICT 
industries as compared to other high-tech sectors; it has a higher productivity growth 
in these sectors; spends more in total on R&D; and gets a higher rate of return out of 
its R&D investments.  For the non-ICT high-tech industries, the picture is less 
devastating for the EU, particularly in the second part of the nineties. There is no 
difference in specialization in these industries, nor a productivity disadvantage.  The 
                                                 
51 The reverse appears to hold for the non-ICT sectors. 
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gap in total expenditures on R&D is also minimal. Unfortunately, however, these 
industries have far less scope for productivity growth than ICT.  
 
4.3. Reforming the EU’s Innovation Capacity : Action is needed in terms of 
resources, framework conditions and linkages : In terms of policy prescriptions, 
what do the results in 4.2 suggest for the innovation capacity of the EU relative to the 
US. While differences in the amount of resources committed are large, it is 
abundantly clear that in addition to much larger investments in R&D both by the 
public and the private sector (i.e. the basic innovation infrastructure), there are also 
other characteristics of the US innovation system which explain its ability to focus on 
the high productivity growth areas and to gain a higher rate of return from its 
knowledge investments.  It is these latter features which determine its superior overall 
innovation capacity and which need to be taken into account in assessing the relative 
effectiveness of both systems. These features relate, as mentioned earlier, to the US’s 
established capacity to link its common innovation infrastructure to technology 
specific know-how and the generally more favourable environment for innovation in 
the US compared to the EU. Gordon (2004) identifies a better connectedness of 
science and industry with an openly competitive system of private and public 
universities and government subsidies to universities through peer-reviewed research 
grants, which result in a higher quality of the research base. Other important 
framework conditions present in the US are the advantage of a large, unified market 
unencumbered by differences in language, customs and standards; a clearer and 
stronger US Intellectual Property Rights system; more flexible financial markets, 
making available venture capital finance to innovating firms; and more flexible 
labour markets, affecting both internal migration and the international immigration of 
highly skilled people.   
 
The importance of the above features to an effective innovation process may help in 
explaining a number of specific worrying trends which have emerged in the EU over 
the 1990’s which are suggestive of the need for a radical overhaul of its knowledge 
creation system. These include the failure, as stressed earlier, to re-orientate its R&D 
activities towards the new, high technology, ICT industries; the increasing proportion 
of R&D by EU firms which is being done outside the EU (over 40%); the large and 
growing brain drain from the EU to the US on the research side (at present, twice as 
many EU researchers move to work in the US compared with the opposite inward 
flows and, in stock terms, DG Research estimates that roughly 40% of US R&D is 
carried out by EU-trained scientists); and finally the US’s rapidly expanding share of 
internationally mobile R&D expenditures (table 10). This latter point is an important 
new risk factor given the evidence52 that such flows are increasing rapidly and that 
the relative quality of third level education systems is a key locational determinant for 
such mobile R&D flows. In overall terms, without EU reforms to its innovation 
system, the present haemorrhaging of R&D spending and of research talent will 





                                                 
52 Mobile R&D expenditures have been growing globally since the mid 1990’s at between 10-15 
percent on an annual average basis. 
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Table 10 : Shares of Mobile World Research Expenditures 
  1987 1995 1997 1999 
FRANCE 4 6 5 4 
GERMANY 10  10  8  7 
UK  7 5 4 4 
JAPAN  32 34 27 21 
US  47 45 56 64 
TOTAL  100 100 100 100 
GROWTH RATES IN GLOBAL R&D EXPENDITURES 
1987-1995 1995-1997 1997-1999   








Source : Conference Board, OECD Science and Technology Database. 
 
Given the above worrying EU trends; the fact that the US’s comparative advantage in 
this area of knowledge production appears to be becoming more entrenched; and that 
the new knowledge industries are increasingly driving economy-wide productivity 
trends, the calls for reform at the EU level are becoming more urgent. What can 
policy makers do to address the EU’s innovation weaknesses ? The most important 
point to stress is that R&D spending is only one of the key elements of a country’s 
knowledge production system – the present analysis has underlined that it is the 
overall package of elements which matters. Reforms are particularly needed in terms 
of entry and exit rules (to allow, for example, new innovative firms to come through 
the system and challenge the incumbents) and in the overall business environment (to 
improve the “rates of return” of any additional R&D investments which may be 
linked to the Lisbon 3% target). This will require getting the framework conditions 
right; improving the overall interconnectedness of the innovation system; and 
ensuring that the common innovation inputs are better aligned on specific technology 
clusters, where the EU’s production structure displays a specialisation. Such a 
technology-specific policy however requires more detailed analysis of the data at the 
sectoral level, even at the technology and firm levels. Furthermore, since innovation 
systems are typically “national”, or even “regional”, data at these levels of 
aggregation should also be brought into the analysis.  
  
Finally, regarding the specific example of the ICT industry, while the current analysis 
has shown the substantial differences between the EU and the US in terms of the 
overall volume of R&D expenditures on ICT, Box 2 also raises more fundamental 
issues regarding the mix of features in the US’s innovation system which have 
conspired to create an industry which has grown in a comparatively short period of 
time to represent 15% of the overall manufacturing output of the US. The failure of 
the EU’s knowledge production sector to seriously challenge the US’s dominance in 
ICT over the second half of the 1990’s, despite all the evidence in the late 1980’s 
suggesting that this was a potentially key driver of productivity growth, is a striking 
example of the EU’s extremely slow pace of structural change. This absence of any 
serious industrial restructuring shows the extent of the challenge facing EU policy 
makers in realizing their Lisbon-imposed, knowledge economy, targets. While 
bridging the EU-US gap in terms of the basic innovation “infrastructure” (i.e. 
spending levels on R&D and third level education) is specifically targeted by policy 
makers, the more difficult task will be to create the innovation “capacity” necessary 
to compete globally in the new high tech industries of the future.  A globally 
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competitive innovation capacity will require action on issues such as the EU’s market 
signalling process, its product market reforms and its overall framework conditions 
which, without change, will seriously restrict the EU’s ambitions to become the most 
knowledge intensive economy in the world.    
 
 
75% OF US PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATE FOR THE PERIOD 1950-2003 WAS BASED ON
MORE KNOWLEDGE INTENSIVE FORMS OF INVESTMENT (R&D + HUMAN CAPITAL)
PRODUCTION AND ABSORPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES :
KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE LONG RUN PRODUCTIVITY STRATEGY
US HAS A SUPERIOR INNOVATION MODEL TO THAT OF THE EU IN TERMS OF BOTH
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REFORMING THE EU’s INNOVATION CAPACITY : ACTION IS NEEDED IN TERMS OF
RESOURCES, FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS AND LINKAGES
 
 
- 55 -  
BOX 2 : HISTORY OF ICT 
The invention of the point contact transistor at AT&T’s Bell Laboratories in the US in 1947 marked the beginning 
of a new technology, semiconductors, which has paved the way for the information age. An important feature of 
this technology is the speed with which microprocessors become more powerful, leading to a widening in the 
number of ICT applications. Semiconductors were initially used for hearing aids and in mainframe computers. In 
the 1950s computers largely replaced mechanical calculators. They were seen as being good in performing 
complicated and lengthy sets of arithmetical operations. The first leading edge applications were military. The 
Korean War won IBM the first contract to deliver a computer. In the late 1950s and early 1960s computers began 
to be used for simple calculations in civilian government agencies (e.g. the Census Bureau) and by the human 
resource departments of large corporations. The next generation of computers was used for storing and releasing 
data in real time. This was important for airline reservation processing, insurance companies and for inventory 
control. The computer surpassed the stage where it was only used as a calculator and became an organizing 
device. In a further step, the invention of the spreadsheet computerized white collar work in the 1980s. But the 
domain of computer usage has been widening further. Robots in manufacturing and scanner based retailing are 
transforming production and distribution processes. The internet, which connects computers all over the world, 
further transforms the way business is conducted. 
In terms of pure numbers, nominal spending on ICT in the US rose from about 1% of GDP in the 1960s to about 
2% in 1980. The share increased further to 3% in 1990 and has reached about 5% to 6% of GDP in the year 2000. 
Given the other distinguishing feature of this technology, namely the rapid speed of technical progress in the 
production of semiconductors, this sector now shows up in the aggregate productivity statistics of those countries 
which have managed to have a sizeable ICT production sector. 
The semiconductor and computer industry has been a US dominated industry since the end of the second World 
War and the US has not given away the lead to other countries though they have faced severe challenges, 
especially from Japan. The ICT industry has some special features which poses specific challenges for 
government-industry interactions. The most important characteristics are :  
o  The semiconductor/computer industry is the high tech industry par excellence. It undertakes large 
amounts of knowledge investments, with R&D shares exceeding hugely the average shares of most 
other manufacturing industries.  
o  The sunk cost nature of R&D requires careful thinking about competition and industrial policy regarding 
the best strategy of combining large R&D efforts with a competitive environment.  
o  The industry also relies on a stream of well educated scientists and engineers as well as on the basic 
research undertaken in national research labs and universities.  
o  Since ICT has become a general purpose technology (GPT), with the ability to influence the productivity 
growth rates of ICT-using industries53, it is also therefore of strategic interest since the products sold by 
this industry shape process innovations in other manufacturing and service sectors.  
How have the Americans achieved such a dominant position and why have other industrialized countries failed to 
catch up to the technology frontier ? What was the mix between knowledge investment, government support and 
market structure that created the success in the US and what were the reasons why Europe stayed behind. The 
history of ICT in the US, Japan and Europe (see table on next page) will at least provide some tentative answers to 
these questions. In the US, early computer technology had a distinctly military focus (Brock, 2003). Japan and 
Europe in contrast tried to reduce the substantial lead of US companies in commercial markets. However both 
regions pursued rather different strategies. Japanese technology policy was based on a system of cooperation and 
competition amongst diverse groups of firms. In Europe, all bets were usually placed on a single ‘national 
champion’, the beneficiary of a steady diet of financial subsidies and preferential procurement policies’ (Flamm, 
1987).  
An important factor in the development of the ICT industry has been the level of knowledge investments. The size 
of R&D spending and government funding of IT shows marked differences between countries. In the early 1970s, 
total R&D spending in the US’s computer industry was about 5 to 6 times larger than the combined efforts in 
Japan, France and the UK  (Flamm, 1987). In the 1960s and early 1970s about 1/3 of all R&D spending in the US 
was publicly financed, while the French and UK share ranged between 10% to 15%. The Japanese share of public 
funding was in between. Thus in contrast to the popular view which saw the US as the least interventionist 
amongst the major industrial countries, it must be acknowledged that the US was strongly supporting industrial 
investment in technology directly in the formative years of the ICT industry.  
                                                 
53 ICT is an innovating technology, i.e. it facilitates productivity improvements in ICT-using industries. 
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It is undeniable that in the 1950s, when commercial applications of the new 
technology were hardly imaginable, that the US government was supporting 
all major computer technology projects. Military projects (such as Whirlwind 
and SAGE) filled assembly lines and helped to train electronic engineers. 
Purchases of the US government (not all was military, the Census Bureau also 
ordered computers) amounted to more than 50% of total sales in the 1950s. If 
one includes defence contractors, about 70% of the computer bill was paid 
directly or indirectly by the taxpayer. Due to the strong increase in the use of 
computers for administrative purposes in large corporations, the government’s 
share fell rapidly in the 1960s. However, government purchases remained the 
largest single factor in sales of new, leading-edge, machines (about 40% until 
the mid 1980s). The US government’s share of funding for computer related 
R&D was 75% in the 1950s, 50% in the mid 1960s, and 15% in the late 
1970s. With the military build up in the 1980s the share increased again to 
more than 20%. 
The US spends vastly more on ICT research than any other country in the 
world and it started much earlier. In the 1950s, many of the American 
computers built were government financed machines later adapted to the 
commercial market. The Airforce’s SAGE project alone accounted for billions 
of dollars in development funds compared to only the tens of millions spent by 
governments in other countries.  
There were four major players in Japan : 1) Ministry of trade and industry 
(MITI) plus its technical arm, the Electrotechnical Laboratory (ETL); 2) Nippon 
Telephone and Telegraph (NTT); 3) Ministry of Education (national 
universities); 4) Industry. The division of labour between these four players and 
how it has changed over time can briefly be described as follows : 
 
-1950S: Research is carried out in 1) to 3). Industry adopted the designs which 
had been developed in the various laboratories. 
-1960S: Erection of trade barriers and the price for foreign admission was access 
to important technology. The first research cooperation amongst Japanese 
manufacturers (NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu) was started and a period of joint 
government–industry cooperation during all phases of research and early 
development began. 
-1970S: Dual crisis: 1) IBM system 370 forces other US companies (which were 
cooperating with Japanese companies) to exit the market. 2) Commitment to 
open Japanese computer market. MITI prescriptions : 1) Increase research 
funding : + 60% in 1973. 2) Consolidate research amongst private firms and 
promote the survival of the largest and technologically fittest firms. 
-1980S: Steep increase in private R&D funding : Like in the US in the 1960s, 
with the large expansion in the commercial sales of Japanese computers, the 
role of private R&D increased (while public funding stayed at a constant 
nominal level). 
The European countries responded to the increasing 
commercial success of US computer companies in the 1960s 
(mainly IBM) with the creation and support of national 
champions. Small firms were encouraged to merge in order to 
exploit scale economies in research and production. The 
national champions in the 1960s were ICL in the UK, CII in 
France and Siemens in Germany. Research subsidies started 
relatively late in the 1960s and were not very generous. 
Especially striking is the UK example. In 1950, the UK’s 
computer technology matched or even surpassed that of the 
US. However, within a decade the lack of financial and 
technical resources led to a decline. The government tried to 
stop this decline by creating ICL via mergers of smaller 
producers. 
 
In the 1980s larger efforts were undertaken to coordinate 
research at a European level. The Esprit program amounted 
to about 1.5 Bio $ over a five year period starting in 1984 
(50% was paid for by the European Community and the 
remainder was paid by participating firms). Numerous 
European firms were cooperating in what was labelled pre-






In the 1950s purchases of computers by the US government and defence 
contractors amounted to about 70% of total sales. In the 1970s the 
government’s share declined to only about 5%.  
In the 1970s, nearly 100% of all the computer purchases of the government 
were Japanese. 
 
Like in other countries, government procurement was used to 
provide markets for national champions. However the share 
of national producers never reached the same levels as in the 
US and Japan. This is likely to have been the result of dismal 
technical performance and not of policy. 
Market 
Structure 
Vigorous antitrust suits instituted during the 1950s played some role in the 
rapid diffusion of semiconductor and computer technology from Bell 
Telephone Laboratories and IBM. Entry and exit into the market played a big 
role in adapting technologies for commercial use. In the early 1970s, the top 5 
companies were IBM, Texas Instruments, Motorola, Western Electric and 
Fairchild. None of them was a leader in the 1950s. Top ranked companies in 
the 1990s such as Microsoft and Intel were not around in the 1970s. However, 
the US government has also responded to foreign competition by allowing for 
more cooperation amongst US companies in R&D.  In 1984 the Joint research 
and Development Act was passed by Congress, which encouraged firms to 
undertake cooperative research (this was likely to have been provoked by 
Japan’s 5
th Generation Computer Research Program in 1981). Furthermore, in 
response to a loss in the US’s market share in the semiconductor industry (the 
Japanese market share exceeded that of the US for the first time in 1986), 
SEMATECH, a joint research effort of the semiconductor industry, was 
initiated and supported by the US government. The defence department 
contributed about 100 Mio $ per year, about 50% of the total budget (the 
project was expected to end in 1997). Reflecting concerns about the national 
security implications of dependence on foreign sources for the supply of 
semiconductors, its goal was mainly to improve US semiconductor production 
technology. That the US government regarded SEMATECH as a national 
project can also be seen by the total entry restrictions for the US affiliates of 
foreign companies. The US also emphasizes industry-university research 
centres. They have been initiated by the government but also by private 
companies (Flamm 1987). 
Joint research (in order to avoid duplication and increase productivity) but 
competition in downstream applications and commercialization e.g. in the 1970s 
the three groups of Japanese computer producers (Fujitsu-Hitachi, Mitsubishi-
Oki and NEC-Toshiba) shared development costs but remained in direct 
competition. MITI coordinated the research cooperation. The government also 
carefully controlled access to the Japanese market, with MITI attempting to 
induce US producers to transfer computer technology to Japanese 
manufacturers. 
 
Because the national champions model was adopted early on, 
antitrust was not an important issue in the computer industry.  
  
5. Summary of Key Findings and Policy Conclusions 
 
This study has analysed productivity trends in the EU over recent years and assessed 
those trends in the context of the Lisbon target of making Europe the most 
competitive, knowledge based, economy in the world by 2010. It is a continuation of 
the work done for an earlier Economic Paper54 which laid out the main aggregate / 
sectoral level productivity trends in the EU and the US as well as identifying the key 
productivity determinants which are relevant in an EU context (i.e. the level of 
regulation; the structure of financial markets; product market integration; ageing; and 
the policy focus of the present paper namely the knowledge sector).   
 
Summary of Key Findings 
 
1. Structural Nature of the EU’s Productivity Downturn is Confirmed   
 
•  The overriding conclusion from the analysis in this paper is that the former 
EU15 group of countries have a structural productivity problem, with this 
problem mainly located in the four large Euro Area member states which 
presently account for close to 80% of the Euro Area’s overall output (2/3 of 
EU15). Unless policies are set in place which lead to a restructuring of the 
EU’s economy towards more knowledge intensive, high productivity growth, 
industries the present EU-US productivity growth differentials will persist.  
 
•  This interpretation of recent productivity trends differs from that of respected 
commentators such as Olivier Blanchard and the IMF which suggest that the 
present productivity downturn is temporary, linked to the substantial labour 
market reforms enacted in many of the EU’s Member States throughout the 
1990’s. In our view these reforms can only explain a small proportion of the 
deterioration in EU productivity since 1995, with the bulk of the decline due 
to the EU’s outdated and inflexible industrial structure which has proved slow 
to adapt to the intensifying pressures of globalisation and rapid technological 
change.  
 
•  The EU’s productivity problems reflect the combined effect of an excessive 
focus on low and medium-technology industries (with declining productivity 
growth rates and a globalisation-induced contraction in investment levels); an 
inability to seriously challenge the US’s dominance in large areas of the ICT 
industry, as reflected in the relatively small size of its ICT production 
industry; and finally, its apparent slowness in reaping the productivity 
enhancing benefits of ICT in a range of ICT-using industries, although 
measurement issues severely complicate an assessment of the gains from ICT 
production and diffusion55.  
                                                 
54  No.208, op.cit. 
55 The paper stresses the need for a critical assessment of the respective roles of ICT production and 
ICT diffusion in explaining EU-US productivity growth differentials. It suggests that, due to 
measurement issues, a higher proportion of the post-1995 acceleration in US productivity should be 
linked with the production of ICT than is commonly assumed.  In terms of diffusion, it stresses that 
ICT capital deepening (diffusion in the narrow sense) is contributing strongly to US productivity 
growth but that the evidence for large TFP gains in specific ICT-using industries (diffusion in the 
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•  The paper also points to the worrying evidence that the US is extending its 
dominance in ICT production to a range of new, high technology, areas in 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and computer-related services.   
 
•  An ongoing and excessive focus on low productivity growth industries is 
particularly problematic for the EU going forward, given that ageing 
populations, globalisation pressures and the ongoing shift to the relatively less 
productive services sector (possibly accelerated and reinforced by the 
emerging demographic trends) will all be working to dampen EU productivity 
growth rates over the medium to long run.  
 
2. The Post-1995 Differences in EU-US Productivity Patterns are fundamentally 
driven by the US’s superiority in terms of its capacity to produce and absorb 
new technologies, most notably in the case of ICT  
 
•  The contrasting productivity experiences of the EU and the US over the post 
1995 period have their origin in the knowledge production sectors of the EU 
and US economies and in a complex range of institutional factors and 
framework conditions which determine a country’s overall innovation system 
and ultimately its success in producing and absorbing the latest, leading edge, 
technologies.  
 
•  The paper argues strongly that healthy knowledge production and absorption 
processes are mutually supportive elements of any successful long run 
productivity strategy.  
 
•  Evidence is presented which suggests that the US’s overall innovation system 
is superior to that of the EU’s, both in terms of the quality and funding of its 
knowledge generating sector and the more favourable framework conditions 
prevailing.  This system has facilitated a substantial re-structuring of the US 
economy since the early 1990’s towards a range of knowledge intensive, high 
productivity, growth industries which have compensated for the relatively 
poor productivity performance of its more traditional industries.  
 
•  The inadequacies of the EU’s overall innovation system have, in contrast, 
been cruelly exposed over the same period. Despite the growing evidence of 
the importance of high productivity growth industries such as ICT, the EU 
continued to focus its R&D investments throughout the 1990’s on relatively 
low productivity growth areas such as cars and chemicals.  
 
•  The repeated ability of the US innovation system to direct resources towards 
the newer, high technology (and often high productivity growth), industries is 
a reflection of the quality of the interrelationships between the different actors 
in its innovation system and of an economic and regulatory framework which 
                                                                                                                                           
broader sense), such as wholesale and retail trade, was still questionable. These latter gains are perhaps 
more modest when proper account is taken of measurement issues and of the role of a number of 
important non-ICT productivity drivers in these specific industries.   
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has the capacity to transform US excellence in the knowledge creation part of 
its innovation system into a globally competitive industrial structure.  
 
•  These strengths of the US system need to be replicated here in Europe if the 
Lisbon-imposed target of increasing R&D expenditure to 3% of GDP is to 
generate the hoped-for economic benefits. As the EU’s experience of the 
1990’s demonstrates, a policy of continuing to focus R&D spending on 
traditional industries or of spreading it uniformly across all industries will do 
little to bridge the EU-US productivity gap when the real issue is one of 
specialising in the new high technology / high productivity growth industries 
of the future. 
 
•  Given the importance of knowledge spillovers at the international level, 
policies aimed at absorption / convergence will continue to play a vitally 
important role for Europe over the coming years and decades. In addition, the 
present analysis argues in favour of a greater recognition of the knowledge 
creation part of the EU’s overall policy framework and of the role it has 
played in the US’s productivity revival over the 1990’s.  
 
•  This heightened awareness of the importance of both knowledge absorption / 
production is already reflected in the Lisbon 2010 objectives and is justified 
given the evidence of the extent to which specific, knowledge-intensive, 
industries such as ICT have the potential to transform productivity patterns. As 
with most of the big productivity success stories over the last 10-15 years, the 
ICT industry is part of a generalised trend towards more knowledge intensive 
forms of investment, with for example individual segments of the ICT sector, 
such as semiconductors, already spending as much on R&D as on physical 
investments.  
 
•  Given globalisation patterns and in particular the increasing international 
mobility of capital and highly skilled researchers, the conclusion is clear, if 
Europe wishes to avoid a globalisation induced “race to the bottom” in low to 
medium-tech industries, it must increasingly focus on knowledge creation / 
absorption and on reforming its innovation system56. This means not only 
devoting an increasing share of its resources to education and R&D but more 
                                                 
56 This view is also shared by the Sapir report (2003) which suggests that the EU economic system’s 
failure to deliver a satisfactory growth performance is due to outdated economic institutions (which 
were supportive of growth in the past but have now become an obstacle to growth) and the failure of 
the EU to transform its industrial structure to achieve an innovation-based economy. The report 
concludes that the European model is not sustainable. High growth in the post-WWII era was driven 
by industrial production, economies of scale and imitation of the US technological advances. As the 
EU approached the technological frontier, growth became increasingly dependent on innovation. 
Economies based on innovation are for Sapir the key to higher employment and growth. The necessary 
new organisational forms, less vertically-integrated firms, greater mobility and flexibility in the labour 
market, larger reliance on market finance, and the high demand for both R&D and higher education – 
all necessary conditions to shift from imitative economies to innovative economies – have not yet 
occurred on a large scale in Europe. The report stresses that innovation will stem from entrepreneurial 
activities but that these activities can only develop if we focus on higher and better education, higher 
levels of better targeted R&D, better regulation to facilitate entry and exit of firms, instead of focussing 
on competition between existing players, more adequate infrastructure to facilitate free movement of 
people, goods and ideas, increased financial means and instruments (i.e. tax incentives) to finance 
innovation, and more labour market flexibility, notably through a lower tax burden on labour. 
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importantly managing this paradigm shift in an effective manner via reforms 
aimed at a fundamental overhaul of its knowledge production / absorption 
system. The objective is to create the framework conditions necessary to 
convert a reformed EU knowledge creation / innovation system into a globally 
competitive industrial structure57. 
 
3. The systemic inadequacies of the EU’s innovation system are highlighted by 
the experience of the ICT industry, with the history of this industry suggesting 
that a “national champions” strategy in high technology industries is highly 
problematic  
 
•  The systemic nature of the EU’s productivity problems is highlighted by an 
analysis of the ICT industry, where a wide range of factors are shown to have 
contributed to the US’s global dominance.  
 
•  In terms of explaining EU-US productivity growth rate differentials, our 
analysis suggests that part of the answer lies in industry specialisation, with 
the US continuing to reap enormous gains from its dominance of the global 
ICT industry58.  
 
•  If this thesis is correct then Europe should clearly be looking at those factors 
which have allowed the ICT industry to flourish in the US. These factors 
include focussed R&D activities; world class research and teaching 
establishments; defence procurement contracts which nurtured the ICT 
industry (on the demand side) in its incubation phase in the 1950’s and 
1960’s; and the unique combination of financing mechanisms (venture 
capitalists / deep and diversified equity markets) and a highly competitive 
domestic marketplace which brought the ICT industry from the knowledge 
creation phase to the critical diffusion / mass market phase.   
 
•  The history of the ICT industry also suggests that a “national champions” 
strategy in high technology industries is doomed to failure, with a number of 
interesting questions emerging from the analysis as to the type of optimal 
competition policy which should be pursued for high technology industries.  
 
•  The paper highlights in particular the large price which Europe has paid for its 
“national champions” policy in the ICT industry back in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, which contrasted sharply with the strategies adopted by Japan and the 
US. In addition, if one looks to the future, and given the changes which have 
occurred over recent decades, it is safe to conclude that the case for such a 
                                                 
57 In this context, an acceptance by policy makers that the structure of an economy largely shapes the 
share of national resources devoted to R&D, inevitably means an acceptance by them of the need to 
restructure EU industry towards more knowledge intensive industries. While this may be true, the 
crucial point to be focussed on in the context of Lisbon is that such a restructuring process will to a 
large extent occur naturally over time as long as policy makers are successful in ensuring an integrated 
innovation infrastructure combined with the framework conditions / flanking policies highlighted in 
the text.  
58 This dominance has if anything become more entrenched over the second half of the 1990’s. 
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“national champions” policy is becoming more and more tenuous as the new 
industries of the future will increasingly need to draw on an EU, or even a 
global, knowledge/talent pool.   
 
4. Without Reform, the US’s Dominance in ICT will be repeated in other 
Knowledge Intensive Industries  
 
•  Given the strategic importance of ICT as a general purpose technology, the 
failure of the EU to mount a serious challenge to the US’s ongoing dominance 
of this industry over the 1990’s epitomises the inadequacies of its innovation 
system. More recent developments suggest that the EU has yet to learn the 
basic lessons from its problems in the ICT area, with the US already opening 
up a sizeable R&D advantage in emerging specialities in the pharmaceuticals 
and biotechnology areas and also in important service industries such as 
software and computer related services.  
 
•  While EU policy makers may recognise the importance of dynamic 
knowledge production and absorption processes in redressing these 
imbalances, their concrete actions to date have been less than encouraging. 
Implementation of reforms aimed at a fundamental overhaul of the EU’s 
innovation infrastructure, allied to action on the associated “framework” 
conditions will be the litmus test of whether the Lisbon targets are to be taken 
seriously or not.   
 
•  More specifically, without an acceptance of the need for excellence in 
education and research, more appropriate market conditions aimed at 
delivering a more dynamic and competitive business environment, and the 
ambition to be world leaders in specific high-tech industries, a Lisbon-induced 
shift of resources into knowledge production activities will have little impact 




In terms of policy, the paper stresses that the EU’s innovation system needs to be 
fundamentally reformed if the EU is to make a decisive shift towards realising the 
vision of a successful, innovation-based, economic model, the broad features of 
which have been laid out in the Lisbon 2010 agenda. Lisbon is in effect a recognition 
of the importance of such a model to the EU’s long run economic prospects and of the 
key role which it must play in responding to the challenges of globalisation and 
ageing. Creating a successful knowledge-based economy involves both enhancing the 
EU’s capacity to produce and commercialize a flow of world class innovative 
technologies and creating an environment conducive to the imitation and absorption 
of externally available know-how. The success of such a model will be determined 
not so much by a massive increase in the amount of financial resources devoted to 
knowledge production (i.e. increased spending on R&D and higher education) but by 
an acceptance of the need to improve linkages in the innovation system and to make 
painful changes in many areas of the EU’s economic and regulatory environment.  
More specifically the present study stresses the following : 
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•  1. The systemic nature of the innovation process needs to be recognised 
and the quality of the interrelationships between the different actors in 
the system needs to be dramatically improved : Firstly, policy makers need 
to recognise that the different players in the innovation system, public 
research institutes; third level education establishments; SME’s and large 
firms are not isolated players but are part of a complex system, with its overall 
strength driven by the relative efficiency of its different components and their 
interconnectedness. While a large number of specific problems can be 
highlighted in relation to the specific players, the most serious issue is the 
poor quality of the linkages within the overall system. In addressing this issue 
of linkages and of the wider problem of an underperforming EU research 
sector, some politically sensitive areas will need to be examined at the 
national and EU levels i.e. the principle of an excellence / meritocratic based 
system for awarding research funds; greater university autonomy, in financial 
as well as academic terms; a change of culture towards the commercialisation 
of research via closer university / business sector links; and the need to 
develop and nurture centres of excellence and leading edge technology 
clusters59.  
 
•  2. The public and private sectors each play important, mutually 
supportive, roles in determining a country’s innovation capacity and each 
must assume its responsibilities : Governments have crucial direct and 
indirect roles to play in the innovation process, directly in the form of 
financial support for human capital development and for the public innovation 
system and, more importantly, indirectly in terms of shaping the 
macroeconomic fundamentals (low and stable inflation; moderate tax burdens 
on labour and capital; trade openness) and providing adequate incentive 
structures (i.e. framework conditions / regulatory regimes) for the private 
sector to enhance productivity via well functioning product, labour and capital 
markets60. The private sector for its part is the ultimate source of productivity 
growth in an economy, with its overall performance determined by the success 
                                                 
59 In this context, it is no accident that the top US regions in terms of knowledge production owe much 
of their success to the presence of world class educational establishments such as San Francisco’s 
Stanford / Berkeley and Boston’s Harvard / MIT. These latter universities have been the key driving 
forces which have propelled the San Francisco and Boston metropolitan areas respectively into the top 
two positions in most global knowledge competitiveness, benchmarking, exercises (see Annex 7). 
60 In terms of framework conditions, specific attention needs to be devoted to the interaction effects 
between R&D and regulation, especially in the area of entry and exit rules; public-private sector 
partnerships; entrepreneurship and the vibrancy of the SME sector. While public sector research 
subsidies will continue to have an important role to play in basic research, the main returns from such 
investments, in terms of commercial applications, will inevitably of course be realised in the private 
sector. Consequently, inappropriate restrictions on market entry; state interventions to protect specific 
companies; or a reluctance on behalf of governments to accept a high degree of company failures, in 
the initial experimental phases at least, are all policies which are likely to be prejudical to an efficient 
and successful innovation system. Finally, it should be noted that the “European Research Area” 
launched in 2000 and the “Investing in Research Action Plan (2003)” address some of the wider 
framework conditions which impact on private R&D investment, e.g. intellectual property rights; 
science and technology human resources; access to venture capital markets; product market 
regulations; “technological platforms”; with a view to both initiating a process of structural change 
towards high tech sectors, and supporting the internal specialization of traditional industries towards 
higher R&D intensity and higher quality products. These measures all aim at influencing the 
specialization of European industries towards high tech sectors and products. 
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of the public sector’s policies in creating a competitive, dynamic, business 
environment and by its own ability to use its labour and capital resources to 
create an industrial structure capable of competing successfully in both the 
domestic and global marketplaces. In addition, public / private sector research 
links are becoming increasingly important in many countries. Due to growing 
competitive pressures over the 1990’s, technological complexity and the high 
risk of failure attached to long run fundamental research, companies have 
increasingly restricted themselves to their core activities in market / process 
oriented research (i.e. the “D” part of R&D). This leaves such companies 
dependent on collaborative links with public research institutes and 
universities for access to long run basic research (i.e. the “R” part of R&D). 
 
•  3. Industry-specific framework conditions need to be taken into account 
due to the complicated relationship between competition and innovation : 
While competition is a crucial determinant of productivity growth, acting as a 
powerful incentive for firms to continuously enhance their underlying 
performance via process or product innovations (thereby differentiating 
themselves from their competitors), there is nevertheless a need to recognise 
the complicated non-linear relationship between innovation and competition. 
This relationship may in fact favour oligopolistic competition between a few 
large firms in some industries or stronger competition among many small 
players in others, as the optimal market structure for boosting the innovation 
process in the respective industries. Due to this non-linear relationship, it is 
incumbent on policy makers to take industry-specific circumstances into 
account when assessing the precise link between competition and 
productivity. Product market conditions (e.g. possibilities for product 
differentiation) and the characteristics of specific technologies (e.g. is it a 
radical or incremental innovation; are there network externalities; are there 
economies of scale in R&D) is what ultimately determines the industry 
specific relationship between market concentration (i.e. the degree of 
competition) and R&D intensity. 
  
•  4. Market entry and exit rules are crucial to an effective innovation 
process in rapidly changing industries : The example of the ICT industry 
highlights the need for policy makers to promote entrepreneurship and a 
healthy process of “creative destruction”.  Entry and exit rules play an 
important role in boosting productivity by putting pressure on incumbent 
firms to innovate and by supporting market experimentation. This 
experimentation role is particularly important in industries where the general 
purpose technologies being used are changing rapidly such as in the 
production and use of ICT. In these industries the evidence is clear that 
product market regulations that facilitate the easy entry and exit of firms have 
contributed enormously to the diffusion of innovations in these industries61.   
                                                 
61 According to the OECD’s firm level analysis (2004), “strict regulations on entrepreneurial activity, 
as well as high costs of adjusting the workforce, negatively affect the entry of new firms. Thus in the 
US, low administrative costs of start-ups and not unduly strict regulations on labour adjustments are 
likely to stimulate potential entrepreneurs to start on a small scale, test the market and, if successful 
with their business plan, expand rapidly to reach the minimum efficient scale. In contrast, higher entry 
and adjustment costs in Europe may stimulate a pre-market selection of business plans with less 
market experimentation.  In addition, the more market-based financial system may lead to a lower risk 




The present analysis has highlighted the need for the EU to shift the emphasis in its 
present economic model more towards innovation. This shift in our view is 
necessitated by the increasing competitive pressures of globalisation, by the future 
challenges of ageing populations and by the fact that many of the EU’s member states 
are close to the technology frontier. Of these factors, the one of most immediate 
concern to productivity patterns is undoubtedly globalisation, with the growing 
interconnectedness of the world’s economy already driving up the pace of 
technological progress, intensifying competitive pressures and magnifying the gains 
from excellence, with the gains being reaped by the US’s global dominance in the 
ICT industry being a good example of the latter. While world trade volumes have 
been rising steadily since the 1950’s, what has changed recently is the nature and 
scale of the globalisation phenomenon, with an increasing focus on trade in services 
and on capital movements in the form of FDI, with for example the stock of FDI as a 
% of world GDP tripling since the mid-1980’s.  
 
This dramatic intensification of the globalisation process is already transforming the 
economic structures of the developed and developing worlds, with India emerging as 
a global power in services, China consolidating its position in manufacturing and with 
the developed world as a whole searching for an appropriate response. Many 
countries in the developed world have recognised the seismic nature of the change 
and are responding positively by embracing an open-economy, innovation-based, 
model which emphasises the importance of world class educational establishments; 
higher levels of, excellence driven and better targeted, R&D; more market based 
financing systems; and more flexible regulatory and institutional frameworks 
delivering a more dynamic and competitive business environment. Others are 
responding in an inappropriate manner by attempting to cling to the belief that our 
present economic problems are temporary and that the magnitude of the changes 
wrought by globalisation will avoid the need for fundamental reforms. In this context, 
the collective challenge for EU governments is to embrace the reality of a rapidly 
changing global marketplace and of the structural changes which it inevitably 
provokes. While Lisbon is a manifestation of this collective desire for change, 
implementation of the needed reforms will be the litmus test of whether the future 
will bring a substantial improvement in the EU’s productivity fortunes or will 






                                                                                                                                           
aversion to project financing in the US, with greater financing possibilities for entrepreneurs with 
small or innovative projects, often characterised by limited cash flows and lack of collateral”. In 
addition, while new firms in the US may start on a smaller scale and be less productive than equivalent 
start-ups here in the EU, if successful in testing the market, these US firms tend to grow more rapidly 
compared with EU start-ups. This experience suggests that the EU must focus not only on reducing the 
regulatory burden on start-up companies but also on the factors inhibiting growth in the post start-up 
phase. 
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1. EU15 HAS A STRUCTURAL PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEM WHICH IS MAINLY LOCATED IN
THE FOUR LARGE EURO AREA MEMBER STATES (GERMANY, FRANCE, ITALY AND SPAIN)
10 KEY POINTS FROM STUDY
2. EU’s PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEMS REFLECT THE COMBINED EFFECT OF AN EXCESSIVE
FOCUS ON LOW AND MEDIUM TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES; AN INABILITY TO SERIOUSLY
CHALLENGE THE US’s DOMINANCE IN LARGE AREAS OF THE ICT INDUSTRY; AND AN
APPARENT SLOWNESS IN REAPING THE PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCING BENEFITS OF ICT IN
A RANGE OF ICT-USING INDUSTRIES
3. THE KEY UNDERLYING FACTORS DRIVING EU-US PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS ARE
A. THE LEVEL OF REGULATION; B. THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS; C.
PRODUCT MARKET INTEGRATION; D. AGEING; and E.THE POLICY FOCUS OF THE
PRESENT PAPER, THE KNOWLEDGE SECTOR
4. KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND ABSORPTION ARE MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE
ELEMENTS OF ANY SUCCESSFUL LONG RUN PRODUCTIVITY STRATEGY
5. US’s INNOVATION SYSTEM IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE EU’s, BOTH IN TERMS OF
THE QUALITY AND FUNDING OF ITS KNOWLEDGE SECTOR AND THE MORE FAVOURABLE
FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS PREVAILING (i.e. an economic and regulatory framework which
effectively promotes entrepreneurship and healthy creative destruction + market
experimentation processes)
6. PAPER HIGHLIGHTS THE LARGE PRICE WHICH EUROPE HAS PAID FOR ITS “NATIONAL
CHAMPIONS“ POLICY IN THE ICT INDUSTRY BACK IN THE 1960's AND 1970's, WHICH
CONTRASTED SHARPLY WITH THE STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY JAPAN AND THE US. A
NUMBER OF KEY FACTORS ALLOWED THE ICT INDUSTRY TO FLOURISH IN THE US.
THESE FACTORS INCLUDED FOCUSSED R&D ACTIVITIES; WORLD CLASS RESEARCH AND
TEACHING ESTABLISHMENTS; DEFENSE PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS WHICH NURTURED
THE INDUSTRY IN ITS INCUBATION PHASE IN THE 1950's AND 1960's; AND THE UNIQUE
COMBINATION OF FINANCING MECHANISMS AND A HIGHLY COMPETITIVE DOMESTIC
MARKETPLACE WHICH BROUGHT THE ICT INDUSTRY FROM THE KNOWLEDGE CREATION
PHASE TO THE CRITICAL DIFFUSION / MASS MARKET PHASE
7. WITHOUT AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED FOR EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION AND
RESEARCH; MORE APPROPRIATE MARKET CONDITIONS AIMED AT DELIVERING A MORE
DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT; AND THE AMBITION TO BE
WORLD LEADERS IN SPECIFIC HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES; A LISBON-INDUCED SHIFT OF
RESOURCES INTO KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON
BRIDGING THE PRESENT EU-US PRODUCTIVITY GAP
8. CREATING A SUCCESSFUL, KNOWLEDGE-BASED, ECONOMY INVOLVES BOTH
ENHANCING THE EU’s CAPACITY TO PRODUCE AND COMMERCIALIZE A FLOW OF WORLD
CLASS INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO
THE IMITATION AND ABSORPTION OF EXTERNALLY AVAILABLE KNOWHOW
9. THE SUCCESS OF SUCH A MODEL WILL BE DETERMINED NOT ONLY BY A LARGE
INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES DEVOTED TO KNOWLEDGE
PRODUCTION BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY BY AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED TO
RADICALLY IMPROVE LINKAGES IN THE INNOVATION SYSTEM AND TO MAKE PAINFUL
CHANGES IN MANY AREAS OF THE EU’s ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
10. WHILE LISBON IS A MANIFESTATION OF A COLLECTIVE EU DESIRE FOR CHANGE,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEEDED REFORMS WILL BE THE LITMUS TEST OF WHETHER
THE FUTURE WILL BRING A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE EU’s PRODUCTIVITY
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ANNEX 1 : SOURCES OF WEALTH DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THE EU AND THE US 
AND THE ONGOING CONTROVERSY OVER MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
 
1. Overview of Sources of Wealth Differentials  
 
EU-US wealth differentials62 can be explained, as indicated in Graph 1 of the main 
text, by differences in the use of labour (number of hours worked / employment 
levels) and by differences in productivity. In fact, in rough terms about 1/3 of the 
differentials are productivity related, with 2/3 due to labour utilisation. What is 
worrying regarding the productivity side is that since 1995 the EU’s relative position 
vis-à-vis the US has deteriorated significantly, with EU productivity growth rates 
substantially lower than those of the US over this period.  Regarding hours worked, 
the EU has experienced an important positive change over the course of the 1990’s 
with the previously downward movement in total hours worked relative to the US 
coming to an end. Given the challenges posed by ageing populations, and the fact that 
the EU’s relative labour input is substantially lower than that of other developed 
economies, it is accepted that much more action will be needed in terms of labour 
market reforms over the coming years. This analysis of wealth differentials 
manifestly underlines the need for a dual policy mandate focussed on improving both 
the EU’s productivity and labour utilisation performances. The problem however for 
policy makers is that the debate has become confused over recent years, with different 
international organisations producing different estimates for the respective 
contributions to the EU’s wealth differentials from productivity and employment.   
Section 2 goes on to look at these measurement issues and tries to draw pragmatic 
conclusions to guide policy makers given the uncertainties involved.   
 
 
2. Ongoing Controversy over Measurement Issues 
 
The IMF in its recently released Article IV report on Euro Area policies maintained 
that the Euro Area did not have a productivity problem since, according to their 
estimates, hourly productivity was higher than in the US and all of the differences in 
per capita incomes were due solely to the lower number of hours worked by Euro 
Area workers.  The IMF estimates referred to the business sector in the Euro Area. 
While ECFIN, in principle, supports the use of the business sector as an indicator, this 
approach suffers from large data availability and timing problems. In the case of the 
IMF’s productivity level estimates, for example, data is only available for 9 of the 12 
Euro Area countries, with the data generally only appearing with a considerable time 
lag. In addition, the future provision of the required data inputs, most notably public 
sector employment figures, is not assured since the ESA95 transmission programme, 
as yet, does not envisage the provision of such data.  
On the basis of Eurostat’s structural indicators, a different picture to that of the IMF 
emerges, with Eurostat’s productivity measure suggesting that 45% of the gap in 
living standards between the Euro Area and the US is due to lower labour 
productivity per hour, with the remaining 55% an hours worked issue. To complicate 
matters even more, the equivalent OECD estimates suggest a position which roughly 
                                                 
62 Wealth differentials are measured by GDP per capita which is the most widely accepted indicator of 
living standards. 
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lies between that of Eurostat and the IMF, namely that the EU has a productivity 
problem but that it is not as severe as suggested by Eurostat. The OECD figures 
roughly coincide with those of ECFIN’s own analysis presented below. This ongoing 
issue of conflicting measurements of the EU-US productivity gap (or the lack of it) is 
fundamental to the present policy debate and the relative emphasis to be placed on the 
employment or productivity aspects of the Lisbon strategy.  
 
Overview of Current Situation and the Extent of the Problems : Graph 1 and Table 
1 show the extent of the problems to be resolved on the basis of the Eurostat and 
OECD estimates (comparable IMF data is not available). While there are some 
differences in terms of GDP per capita and the per person employed productivity 
measures, it is very clear that the real source of the differences lies in the hours 
worked calculations and the associated hourly labour productivity figures. 
 
Graph 1 : Comparison of GDP per capita, employment rates, hours worked per 
worker and labour productivity : Eurostat versus OECD  













GDP per capita in
PPS








(1) Calculated - Employment rate = 100 * (GDP per capita / Labour productivity per person employed)
(2) Calculated - Hours worked per worker =100 * (Labour productivity per person employed / Hourly labour productivity)
Source: DG Ecfin 
 
 
Table 1 : Year 2002 Estimates 
  EUROSTAT OECD 
GDP PER CAPITA IN PPS 71.8  73.0 
EMPLOYMENT RATE 86.6  91.3 
HOURS WORKED PER WORKER 95.5  87.9 
HOURLY LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 86.8  91.0 





3. Short and Long Run Solutions  
 
There seems to be only one long term durable solution to these ongoing productivity 
measurement problems and that is for all of the interested parties, most notably 
Eurostat, the OECD and the IMF, to discuss the different methodologies which they 
employ for calculating the various input series. This in fact is what is happening at the 
moment, with Eurostat and the OECD actively discussing these issues.  It is hoped 
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that a final long run resolution to these problems can be forthcoming in the coming 
months.   
 
Regarding possible short run solutions, ECFIN decided that given the uncertainties 
involved, it was very important to have its own internally produced productivity 
series for analytical purposes. Following an assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various statistical sources, the most internally consistent source 
was deemed to be the OECD’s labour force statistics databank, which has 
internationally comparable figures for hours worked and employment for both the 
EU’s Member States as well as for the US (see Graphs 2 and 3)63. Once convergence 
has been reached in the discussions between Eurostat and the OECD regarding the 
best input series to be utilised, ECFIN will adjust its own methodology to make it 
fully consistent. According to the ECFIN staff who are participating as observers to 
the Eurostat / OECD discussions, it appears that the final solution will not differ 
dramatically from the estimates shown in Graphs 2 and 364. In fact, in terms of 
productivity levels, the EU15 estimate is likely to lie between the present OECD and 
Eurostat estimates. If this is what turns out to be the basis of a final consensus, the 
IMF’s viewpoint that the EU15 does not have a productivity problem (and 
consequently that it should focus its Lisbon agenda solely on the employment front) 
will not be supported by the underlying data. This IMF position, it should be stressed, 
only applies to productivity levels, with the IMF also accepting that there has been a 
significant deterioration in the EU’s relative position over recent years due to much 
lower EU productivity growth rates compared with those of the US.  
 
Graph 2 : EU15 – GDP per Capita + Labour Productivity per person employed -
1965-2005* (US = 100) 







Labour Productivity per 
person employed
* 2003-2005 : Estimates based on ECFIN’s Spring 2004 short-term forecasts and using an assumption 
of unchanged hours worked. 
Source : OECD, ECFIN calculations 
                                                 
63 The hours worked and productivity calculations are based on the OECD’s labour force statistics. 
These calculations mirror the OECD’s own methodology for calculating productivity levels, with 
ECFIN deriving the productivity growth rates from the levels.  One should note that the OECD use a 
combination of labour force and national accounts data sources for their productivity growth rate 
calculations. 
64 It has been tentatively agreed that the OECD, for the purpose of productivity measurement, will 
move from the labour force framework to the national accounts. Eurostat will align their basic numbers 
for the US with those from the OECD, with the OECD in turn converging towards Eurostat’s figures 
for the individual EU Member States. 
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Graph 3 : EU15 – Hours Worked + Labour Productivity per Hour  
 -1965-2005* (US = 100) 









Labour Productivity per 
Hour Worked
* 2003-2005 : Estimates based on ECFIN’s Spring 2004 short-term forecasts and using an assumption 
of unchanged hours worked. 
Source : OECD, ECFIN calculations 
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
 
While it is accepted that there is still an ongoing controversy regarding the relative 
levels of productivity between the EU and the US, the most important point to stress 
is that there is no dispute between Eurostat, the OECD and the IMF regarding the fact 
that the EU’s labour productivity performance has deteriorated significantly in the 
post 1995 period relative to that of the US. Given this analysis, and the accepted need 
for action on the employment front, it is incumbent on policy makers to adopt a dual 
policy focus over the medium to long run. The experience of a number of the EU’s 
Member States and the US suggests that there is no justification for an exclusive 
focus on either employment growth or on productivity growth, with GDP per capita 
depending on both. From a policy perspective, the key objective must be to raise 
productivity levels using all the available instruments to stimulate the growth of total 
factor productivity, whilst at the same time encouraging the labour-intensive growth 
pattern that is needed to move towards full employment.  
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ANNEX 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW ON INNOVATION,  
PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWTH 
 
It is now widely recognized in the economic literature that R&D and innovation are 
major drivers of economic growth. An economy’s ability to exploit novel 
technologies and to adapt to a rapidly changing technological environment is seen as 
essential to its prospects for improving standards of living and prosperity.  
 
1. THEORIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH : Macroeconomic theories of economic growth, 
both the neoclassical and the endogenous growth models, reflect the role of “technical 
progress” in economic development.    
 
Neoclassical models emphasize the accumulation of physical and human capital 
which are subject to diminishing returns (Solow (1956), Swan (1956)).  Hence capital 
accumulation drives productivity growth in the short-run but eventually capital is 
subject to diminishing returns. Consequently, long-run steady state growth can only 
be accounted for through exogenous technological change. Despite its vital 
importance to growth, technological progress is left unexplained. This does not mean 
that technology plays no role in this framework. On the contrary, in its steady state, 
technical progress is the only reason why there is growth.  It is however treated as 
exogenous, i.e. left unexplained. 
The continued appeal of the neoclassical growth model lies in the straightforward 
growth accounting methodology it delivers for measuring the rate of technological 
progress. Under the usual neoclassical assumptions (perfect competition, input 
exhaustion, absence of spillovers, Hicks-neutral technical progress) the rate of 
technical progress equals the Solow residual or “Total Factor Productivity” growth.  
Being constructed as a “residual” it represents a “measure of our ignorance” 
(Abramovitz (1956)).  In Solow’s pioneering study, growth in per-capita income was 
almost entirely attributed to technological progress.  Subsequent refinements (see e.g. 
Stiroh (2001)), improving the measurement of inputs and expanding the definition of 
investment beyond tangible assets, have squeezed down the residual. Mankiw, Romer 
& Weil (1992) further extended the neo-classical growth model by augmenting the 
production function with human capital, proxied by education, improving the 
performance of the Solow model in cross-country studies. 
Endogenous growth models generate long-term growth without relying on 
exogenous technical progress.  A first approach taken by the so-called “AK” models 
is to remove the diminishing-returns-to-capital property of the neoclassical approach, 
by supposing that output is a linear function of capital.  In this setting, productivity 
growth can continue without bound. Another route is taken by the “R&D-based” 
endogenous growth or “idea” models.  A firm’s production function is defined by 
firm-specific variables (capital, labour and R&D inputs) plus a shift term, which is a 
function of the general stock of knowledge available to all firms.  This reflects the 
public good characteristics of knowledge generating activities such as R&D (Romer 
(1986)).  Alternatively, it could also reflect a “learning by doing” process, where 
investment in physical capital is a source of spillovers as the aggregate capital stock 
increases.  The shift factor is in this case determined by past gross investment (Arrow 
(1962)).  Lucas (1998) considered the shift factor to be a function of the stock of 
human capital. 
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Endogenous growth models “endogenize” the generation of ideas.  Ideas are 
generated by R&D performed by profit maximizing R&D firms and lead to new 
processes and products which are used as inputs in the production of final goods.  As 
input goods of superior quality or as more specialized intermediate or capital goods, 
these “products” raised productivity (Romer (1990), Grossman & Helpman (1991) 
and Aghion & Howitt (1992)). The ideas generating process is characterized by the 
presence of very large fixed costs and zero marginal costs.  Since with increasing 
returns to scale, average costs is always larger than marginal costs, producing new 
ideas at profit requires a move away from perfect competition in the research sector. 
Ideas are at least partly public goods. New knowledge generated by the R&D 
activities of one agent can stimulate the development of new knowledge by others, 
thus giving rise to positive externalities or “knowledge” spillovers.  However, 
spillovers are not “manna from heaven” and require investment in “absorptive 
capacities” to be successfully implemented (Cohen & Levinthal (1989)).  Endogenous 
growth theory provides a suitable analytical framework to assess the economic impact 
of international knowledge flows. The seminal Grossman & Helpman (1991) model 
leads to the prediction that the international diffusion of knowledge, through 
international trade in intermediate goods, increases the growth rates of output and 
productivity.  These models lead to the prediction that the growth of TFP in countries 
increases with the degree of openness and the absorptive capacities of the countries.    
Both neoclassical and endogenous growth models are criticized for not being able to 
fully account for the complex relationship between R&D and economic growth. Only 
recently economic theory has tried to zero in on the micro processes through which 
R&D influences growth. Aghion and various co-authors65 examine the 
microeconomic foundations of growth theory, developing models of the interplay 
between growth, industrial organization, and contracts and institutions. Their work 
provides a framework for analysing the effect of product market competition on the 
relationship between innovation and growth.   While on the one hand, post-innovation 
competition may compete away the rents from innovation and hence stifle the 
incentives for firms to innovate, these models stress that at the same time, more pre-
innovation competition may lead to more innovation as a way for firms to escape 
competition. Whether the “escape competition” effect dominates the “rent 
dissipation” effect will depend on how close the firms/industries/countries are to the 
technology frontier.  Competition has a more positive effect on growth for those firms 
and industries that are closer to the frontier. 
 
While macro-economic models of technological progress emphasize the importance 
of public and private investment in knowledge infrastructure by public and private 
agents, the literature on “National Innovation Systems” (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 
1992; Nelson 1993) stresses the character and intensity of the interactions between 
the elements of the system.  In this view, innovation and technological development 
depend increasingly on the ability to utilise new knowledge produced elsewhere and 
to combine this with knowledge already available in the economy. The capacity to 
absorb new knowledge, to transfer and diffuse knowledge, and the ability to learn by 
interaction are crucial success factors in innovation (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal 1989). 
New and commercially useful knowledge is not only the result of the conscious 
                                                 
65 For example Acemoglu, Aghion & Zilibotti (2002) and Agion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith & Howitt 
(2003)). 
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action of creative individuals but also of the interaction and learning processes among 
various actors in innovation systems, i.e. producers, users, suppliers, public 
authorities and scientific institutions, which David & Foray (1995) term the 
"knowledge distribution power" of the innovation system. These interactions incite 
the process through which knowledge spillovers will influence economic growth, as 
detailed in the endogenous growth theory literature.    
From the National Innovation System perspective, country differences with respect to 
innovation and growth might reflect not just different endowments in terms of labour, 
capital and the stock of knowledge, but also the varying degrees of the “knowledge 
distribution power” or the efficiency of the innovation system.  The problem with this 
approach, however, is to approximate empirically the institutional framework and the 
“knowledge distribution power” of nations.  What is available at present are only 
pieces of evidence showing the importance of interactions, such as cooperative R&D 
agreements among firms, between firms and universities or the availability of 
venture-backed financing (see for example, Stern et al. (2000)). In addition, there are 
the first attempts to link economy-wide growth to policy and institutional variables 
(OECD (2004)).   
 
2.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY  :  The effects of 
innovation on productivity have been analysed in many empirical studies at different 
levels of aggregation (country, industry or firm level).  Comparing these studies is 
difficult because of various levels of aggregation, definitions of productivity (TFP vs. 
labour productivity), definitions of innovation (R&D expenditures vs. patents vs. 
innovations) and various methodological approaches (case studies, growth 
accounting, econometric analysis of cost functions vs. production functions vs. 
productivity studies 66).  Furthermore these studies are plagued by many problems, 
such as the construction of the R&D capital stock, requiring growth and depreciation 
rate assumptions;  the issue of double counting of the expenditures on labour and 
capital in R&D; the use of price deflators for measuring output; the measurement of 
the quality of traditional inputs;  the measurement of spillovers. 
 
Despite the various approaches and problems, the evidence clearly points at R&D and 
innovation as a main driver of productivity growth.  Following the pioneering work 
of Griliches (1988), a large number of empirical studies at the country, firm and 
sectoral level have confirmed a positive impact of R&D activity on productivity 
growth (for a review of the literature see e.g. Mairesse & Sassenou 1991, Mohnen 
2001, WIFO 2001, Mairesse & Mohnen 2002; OECD 2004).  
We summarize the major findings below: 
•  In the long term there is a significant effect of R&D intensity on TFP growth 
for OECD countries (OECD, 2004, Bassanini et al 2001).  In some countries, 
the average rate of return on R&D investment is more than twice the rate of 
return on investment in capital equipment. 
                                                 
66 In the production and cost function approach, R&D capital is used, whereas productivity studies use 
R&D intensity.  In the production function approach the estimated elasticities of R&D are constant 
across units, whereas in the productivity approach it is assumed that the rate of return to R&D is 
constant across units.   
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•  Regressions including separate variables for public and private R&D suggest 
that it is the private R&D that drives the positive association between R&D 
intensity and output growth (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 2001). 
•  A country’s own R&D and human capital contributes positively to the speed 
of catching-up (Griffith et al 2000). 
•  Empirical studies attempting to assess the importance of knowledge spillovers 
have identified the international transfer of technology as an important driver 
of growth (e.g. Griliches 1992; Geroski 1996; Mohnen & Mairesse 1999) with 
foreign innovative activity having a major impact on domestic productivity, 
especially for smaller, open countries  (Eaton and Kortum 1997). A major 
issue in this literature is the identification of the channels through which 
knowledge is transferred internationally. Most extensively studied has been 
the role of international trade, in particular imports (e.g. Coe and Helpman 
1995). Recently studies have begun to examine the role of foreign direct 
investment by multinational firms (Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie 2001; Branstetter 2000). 
•  The results from micro level studies confirm a strong relationship between 
R&D and productivity growth, with the reported private rates of return, if 
significant, in a range of 7% to 69% and the elasticities in the range of .02 to 
.38 (WIFO 2001).  Not correcting for double counting considerably biases the 
estimated coefficients downwards (Schankerman (1981), Mairesse & Hall 
(1996)). 
•  The social rates of return are even higher, as knowledge spillovers between 
firms can double the rate of private returns. Griliches (1992) concludes that 
“’spillovers are present, their magnitude may be quite large and social rates of 
return remain significantly above private rates”. However, the results vary 
considerably between studies and industries.  Furthermore, it is not clear 
whether intra- or inter-industry spillovers are more important.  Branstetter 
(1996) and Cincera (1998) suggest that spillover effects are more national 
than international in scope. 
•  Whether returns to R&D vary across sectors and countries is hard to assess.  
Most studies indicate significant differences in the rates of return of specific 
sectors but there is little consensus as to which industries have higher rates of 
return.  Comparing returns across countries also leave an inconclusive result, 
although US firms generally come out stronger than the EU. 
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ANNEX 3 : HOW DOES THE EU COMPARE AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL IN TERMS OF 
PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS 
 
Table 1 gives the period averages for productivity growth rates for the 1980’s, the 
first and second halves of the 1990’s and 2001-2003. The HP filtered trend 
performance for the period 1981-2003 for a selected number of countries and regions 
is given in Graphs 1 to 6. Compared with the world aggregate, EU15 productivity 
growth rates have been consistently lower over the last two decades, with the world 
total being influenced to a considerable extent over that period by a large number of 
newly emerging global powers; most notably the strong convergence related 
performances from China and India67.  Compared with the relatively more developed 
areas of the world, the EU was holding its own up until the mid 1990’s but, as Graph 
1 indicates, over the subsequent period to 2003 trends have deteriorated considerably, 
especially with regard to the US but more recently also with Japan.    
 
TABLE 1 : LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (PERIOD AVERAGES -PER PERSON EMPLOYED) 
  1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2003 
WORLD  5.0 3.3 3.1 1.0 
CHINA  10.1 13.0  8.0  7.3 
INDIA  7.6 5.4 4.4 3.8 
JAPAN  2.7 0.8 1.4 1.5 
US  1.3 1.4 2.2 1.3 
EU25  NA  NA  1.5 0.9 
FURTHER BREAKDOWN OF EU25 
NEW  MEMBER  STATES 
(EU10) 
NA  NA  3.6 3.8 
EXISTING MEMBER STATES 
(EU15) 
1.8 2.0 1.2 0.4 
NON- EURO AREA  1.8 2.4 1.7 1.1 
EURO AREA  1.8 1.8 1.0 0.3 
FURTHER BREAKDOWN OF EURO AREA 
BIG FOUR  1.9 2.0 0.8 0.2 





                                                 
67 It is important to put the high labour productivity growth rates for China and India into perspective – 
overall productivity levels in these countries are still less than 10% of those in the US whereas the EU 
is at around 90% of US levels. 
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GRAPH 1 : EU15 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS VIS-À-VIS THE US AND JAPAN 











While overall EU productivity trends have clearly deteriorated over recent years, it is 
important to underline the wide range of performances at the individual EU Member 
State level, with large numbers of countries comparing favourably with international 
trends.  For example, for the EU’s 10 new Member States, the post-1995 pattern has 
been very positive in terms of productivity, with the group easily outperforming the 
world total over the period as a whole and most notably continuing to produce solid 
gains over the 2001-2003 period when most areas of the world were hit with a 
sizeable slowdown.  However, as with India and China, a large part of the 
productivity growth in this part of the EU was undoubtedly a catching-up 
phenomenon, aided and fuelled by the prospect of full EU membership.   
 
With regard to the performance of the existing Member States, there is also a clear 
divergence between the Euro Area and non-Euro Area countries.  Graph 2 indicates 
clearly that the non-Euro Area countries have been able to arrest the decline in their 
1980’s productivity growth rate and stabilise it in the 1 ½ -2% range over the 1990’s. 
Over the same period the Euro Area countries have experienced a decline in their 
productivity growth rate from close to 2% to well under 1%.  Graph 2 also indicates 
that this Euro Area pattern is dictated by developments in the big four area countries, 
namely Germany, France, Italy and Spain (see also graphs 3-6). The remaining 8 
Euro Area countries have managed to achieve an acceleration in their productivity 
growth rates between the first and second halves of the 1990’s.  The problem of 
course is that with the big four countries accounting for nearly 80% of overall Euro 
Area output, the poor performances from all four of these countries ensures that the 
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GRAPH 2 : EU15 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY PER PERSON EMPLOYED TRENDS (EURO 
AREA AND NON-EURO AREA) 

























GRAPH 3 : GERMANY : TREND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES (1981-2003) 
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GRAPH 4 : FRANCE* : TREND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES (1981-2003) 














*While productivity trends in France had been declining significantly over the 1980’s and the early 
part of the 1990’s, the more recent trends appear to suggest a stabilisation.  However, interpretation of 
these more recent trends is complicated by the introduction of a statutory 35-hour week via the “Aubry 
laws” of 1998 and 2000 which resulted in large changes in terms of working time. More time will be 
needed to fully assess the implications of these changes for long run productivity developments. 
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GRAPH 5 : ITALY : TREND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES (1981-2003) 
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GRAPH 6 : SPAIN : TREND PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES (1981-2003) 
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ANNEX 4 : THE EU’S SLOW GROWTH PROBLEM 
 
Data Analysis : Table 1 below sets the background for the growing interest in 
productivity issues. The table shows period averages for 5 key variables 
(employment, productivity, GDP, population and GDP per capita) for the US, 
EU15, EU4 (the 4 large Euro Area countries – Germany, France, Italy and Spain) 
and for EU11 (the remaining 11 of the EU15 aggregate). Data problems precluded 
extending this analysis to the new Member States. 
Table 1 : Employment, Productivity, GDP, Population and GDP per capita 
developments in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, US and EU aggregates 
Germany France Spain  Italy EU4 EU11 EU15 US
1961-1980
Employment 0,2 0,6 0 0,1 0,3 0,4 0,3 2,1
Productivity 3,4 3,8 5,4 4,6 3,9 3,1 3,6 1,7
GDP 3,6 4,4 5,4 4,7 4,2 3,4 3,9 3,7
Population 0,5 0,8 1,1 0,7 0,7 0,5 0,6 1,2
GDP per capita 3,1 3,6 4,3 4 3,5 2,9 3,3 2,5
1981-1990
Employment 1 0,3 1,1 0,6 0,7 0,6 0,7 1,8
Productivity 1,3 2,2 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,8 1,7 1,3
GDP 2,3 2,5 2,9 2,3 2,4 2,4 2,4 3,1
Population 0,3 0,6 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,9
GDP per capita 2 1,9 2,6 2,2 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,2
1991-1995
Employment 0 -0,1 -0,3 -0,6 -0,2 -0,6 -0,4 1,1
Productivity 2 1,2 1,8 1,9 1,9 2,3 2,1 1,3
GDP 2 1,1 1,5 1,3 1,6 1,6 1,6 2,5
Population 1,3 0,5 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,5 1
GDP per capita 0,7 0,6 1,3 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,1 1,5
1996-2000
Employment 0,7 1,4 3 1 1,3 1,6 1,4 2
Productivity 1,1 1,3 0,8 0,9 1,1 1,8 1,3 2
GDP 1,8 2,7 3,8 1,9 2,3 3,5 2,7 4,1
Population 0,1 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,9
GDP per capita 1,7 2,3 3,5 1,8 2 3,2 2,4 3,2
2001-2005
Employment -0,1 0,7 2 1,2 0,7 0,5 0,6 0,1
Productivity 0,9 0,9 0,7 -0,1 0,7 1,5 1 2,5
GDP 0,8 1,6 2,7 1,1 1,3 2 1,5 2,6
Population 0,1 0,5 0,7 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,3 1,5
GDP per capita 0,7 1,1 2 1 1 1,6 1,2 1,1  
 
While a large number of key points are highlighted by the table, we will 
concentrate on the productivity and GDP per capita (i.e. living standards) trends 
for the EU aggregates : 
•  For the periods 1961-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-1995, the productivity 
and GDP per capita patterns were very similar for the EU aggregates 
shown in the Table. For the US, while per capita income growth did not 
diverge dramatically from that of the EU over these periods, there were 
big differences in the components, with the US pattern characterised by 
lower productivity and higher employment compared with the EU. 
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•  The table indicates a large structural break after 1995, with the US pulling 
significantly ahead of the big four Euro Area economies but not relative to 
the rest of the EU15 countries. 
•  In terms of the source of differences in per capita growth rates, it is clear 
that the big divergence in the post 1995 period has been in terms of 
productivity growth trends, not employment trends. The graphs below 
reinforce the points made regarding the structural break from the mid-
1990’s onwards. 
Graphical Analysis : The graphs concentrate on the post 1995 period and show that 
the US has consistently outperformed the EU4 group in GDP growth rate terms, with 
this growth advantage increasingly emanating from the productivity side.  They show 
that the gap in performance is much less for the EU11 group on virtually all fronts.  In 
fact, in terms of the growth rate of GDP per capita, the EU11 group has equalled or 
outperformed the US since the mid-1990’s.  In terms of productivity, which is the 
focus of the present paper, it is clear that it is the EU4 group of countries where the 
problems lie (this is also supported by the evidence presented in Annex 3). Since 
these 4 large Euro Area economies as a whole represent nearly 2/3 of overall EU15 
output, this ensures that the EU as a whole compares badly in comparisons with the 
US. 
 
Graph 1 : Comparison of EU4, EU11 and US performances over the periods 
1996-2000 and 2001-2005 
 
1a : Employment 











1b : Productivity (GDP per person employed) 
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1c : GDP 










1d : Population 










1e : GDP per capita 
































ANNEX 5 : VALUE ADDED SHARES AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATES  
OF THE 56 INDUSTRIES 
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Manufacturing Private Services Rest of 
Economy
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ANNEX 6 : LEVELS ANALYSIS FOR THE 56 INDUSTRIES (EU15 VALUE ADDED,  
PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT LEVELS RELATIVE TO US) 
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Manufacturing Private Services Rest of 
Economy
 
* Economy-wide PPP’s are used. EU15 values have been aggregated from the Member States data using economy-wide PPP’s. 
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Manufacturing Private Services Rest of 
Economy
 
* Labour input (employment * hours worked per employee) – Share of overall economy wide labour input allocated to the different industries. 
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Manufacturing Private Services Rest of 
Economy
 
* Economy-wide PPP’s are used.  EU15 values have been aggregated from Member States data using economy-wide PPP’s. The relative value added levels have been 
corrected for the differences in the respective size of the two economies using the labour input figures. The values in Graph 3 are the product of the values in Graphs 1 and 2. 




















ANNEX 7 : ADDITIONAL TABLES AND GRAPHS  
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TABLE 1 : WORLD’S TOP 50 MOST KNOWLEDGE COMPETITIVE REGIONS : 2004 
(BASED ON KNOWLEDGE COMPETITIVENESS + KNOWLEDGE INTENSITY) 
World Knowledge Competitiveness Index Knowledge Intensity Ratio*
Region Country Region Country
1.San Francisco US 1.San Francisco US
2. Boston US 2. Detroit US
3. Grand Rapids US 3. Grand Rapids US
4. Seattle US 4. San Diego US
5. Hartford US 5. Austin US
6. San Diego US 6. Shiga Japan
7. Rochester US 7. Stockholm Sweden
8. Sacramento US 8. Los Angeles US
9. Austin US 9. Rochester US
10. Minneapolis US 10. Seattle US
11. Los Angeles US 11. West Sweden Sweden
12.Detroit US 12.Cincinnati US
13. New York US 13. Sacramento US
14. Denver US 14. Uusimaa (Helsinki) Finland
15. Stockholm Sweden 15. South East UK UK
16. Philadelphia US 16. Minneapolis US
17. Chicago US 17. South Sweden Sweden
18. Cincinnati US 18. Shizuoka Japan
19. Uusimaa (Helsinki) Finland 19. Portland US
20. Portland US 20. Philadelphia US
21. Dallas US 21. Eastern UK UK
22. Raleigh-Durham US 22. Tochigi Japan
23. Washington US 23. Chicago US
24. Salt Lake City US 24. Raleigh US
25. Houston US 25. Denver US
26. Indianapolis US 26. Milwaukee US
27. Milwaukee US 27. Indianapolis US
28. Buffalo US 28. Toyama Japan
29. Columbus US 29. Cleveland US
30. Phoenix US 30. Salt Lake City US
31. Atlanta US 31. Pittsburgh US
32. Kansas US 32. Switzerland Switzerland
33. Cleveland US 33. Boston US
34. Ile De France France 34. Singapore Singapore
35. Pittsburgh US 35. Phoenix US
36. Charlotte-Gastonia  US 36. New York US
37. Richmond US 37. South Netherlands Netherlands
38. Tokyo Japan 38. Kanagawa Japan
39. Shiga Japan 39. Kansas US
40. South East UK UK 40. Ontario Canada
41. Greensboro US 41. Columbus US
42. St. Louis US 42. Aichi Japan
43. San Antonio US 43. Houston US
44. West Sweden Sweden 44. Hartford US
45. Switzerland Switzerland 45. Dallas US
46. London UK 46. Baden Wurtemberg Germany
47. Nashville US 47. Ile de France France
48. Norfolk US 48. Washington US
49. Louisville US 49. St. Louis US
50. Eastern UK UK 50. Denmark Denmark
Countries in which the Top 50 Regions are Located
1. KNOWLEDGE COMPETITIVENESS 2. KNOWLEDGE INTENSITY
NORTH AMERICA 40 NORTH AMERICA 32
EUROPE 8 EUROPE 11
ASIA / PACIFIC 2 ASIA / PACIFIC 7
* "The regional ratio of knowledge intensity is calculated on the basis of each region's World Knowledge Competitiveness Index score relative 
to its index of GDP per capita. Such a measure is the best available derivative of the relative importance of knowledge and knowledge-based
activities to the overall economic performance and structure of each region.  
Source : World Knowledge Competitiveness Index 2004, Robert Huggins Associates 
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TABLE 2A : EUROPEAN REGIONAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX 
TOP 20 REGIONS B OTTOM 20 REGIONS 
RANK R EGION I NDEX R ANK R EGION I NDEX 
1  Uusimaa, Finland  261.8  72  Région Wallonne, Belgium  55.3 
2 Stockholm,  Sweden  252.3  73 Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany  52.1 
3  Brussels, Belgium  248.1  74  Border, Midlands & Western, Ireland  50.1 
4  Ile de France, France  230.0  75  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany  49.1 
5 Switzerland  224.7  76 Abruzzo-Molise,  Italy  48.8 
6 Luxembourg  222.0  77 Portugal  (Continent)  40.6 
7 Hamburg,  Germany  211.5 78  Attiki,  Greece  38.9 
8  London, UK  186.4  79  Canarias, Spain  38.4 
9 Norway  184.6  80 Sardegna,  Italy  26.3 
10 Bremen,  Germany  178.9  81  Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti, Greece  22.4 
11  Baden-Württemberg, Germany  175.9  82  Madeira, Portugal  22.1 
12  South East, UK  171.7  83  Azores, Portugal  21.9 
13 Hessen,  Germany  170.7  84  Campania,  Italy  19.5 
14 West-Nederland,  Netherlands  168.2  85  Noroeste,  Spain  18.5 
15 Bayern,  Germany  160.1  86  Sicilia,  Italy  15.6 
16  Berlin, Germany  154.9  87  Sud, Italy  13.9 
17 Eastern,  UK  152.7  88  Centro,  Spain  13.6 
18 Denmark  142.6  89  Vareia Ellada, Greece  11.5 
19  Vestsverige, Sweden  135.6  90  Sur, Spain  7.3 
20 Zuid-Nederland,  Netherlands  135.0  91  Kentriki Ellada, Greece  2.4 
Source : European Competitiveness Index 2004, Robert Huggins Associates 
 
TABLE 2B : EUROPEAN REGIONAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX  : BREAKDOWN OF 
COMPOSITE INDEX AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
 















Uusimaa, Finland  1 1 8 50 
Stockholm, Sweden  2 6 4 60 
Brussels, Belgium  3 22 3 12 
Ile de France, France  4 2 9 47 
Switzerland  5 23 1 16 
Luxembourg  6 42 5 1 
Hamburg, Germany  7 7 7 4 
London, UK  8 19 10 65 
Norway  9 12 2 52 
Bremen, Germany  10 5 26 2 
Baden-Württemberg, Germany  11 11 17 38 
South East, UK  12 8 11 53 
Hessen, Germany  13 34 21 9 
West-Nederland, Netherlands  14 9 12 8 
Bayern, Germany  15 18 16 21 
Berlin, Germany  16 3 60 32 
Eastern, UK  17 15 14 71 
Denmark  18 17 13 44 
Vestsverige, Sweden  19 89 19 58 
Zuid-Nederland, Netherlands  20 84 22 5 
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TABLE 3 : WORLD’S TOP 20 UNIVERSITIES 
WORLD 
RANKING 
UNIVERSITY C OUNTRY 
1  Harvard US 
2  Stanford (California)  US 
3  Cambridge UK 
4  University of California – Berkeley  US 
5  MIT US 
6  California Institute of Technology  US 
7  Princeton US 
8  Oxford UK 
9  Columbia US 
10  Chicago US 
11  Yale US 
12  Cornell US 
13  University of California – San Diego  US 
14  Tokyo Japan 
15  Pennsylvania US 
16  University of California – Los Angeles  US 
17  University of California – San Francisco  US 
18  Wisconsin – Madison  US 
19  Michigan – Ann Arbor  US 
20  Washington – Seattle  US 
Source : Academic Ranking of World Universities, 2004 
 
 
Ranking Criteria and Weights 
Criteria  Indicator  Weight 
Quality of 
Education 
Alumni of an institution winning Nobel 
Prizes and Field Medals  10% 
Staff of an institution winning Nobel 
Prizes and Field Medals  20%  Quality of 
Faculty  Highly cited researchers in 21 broad 
subject categories  20% 
Articles published in Nature and Science  20% 
Research 
Output  Articles in Science Citation Index-





Academic performance with respect to the 
size of an institution  10% 
Total   100% 
Source : Academic Ranking of World Universities, 2004 
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TABLE 4 : OBSERVED AND “STRUCTURAL” HOURLY PRODUCTIVITY IN 2002 
(% OF US) 
Effect of the gap with the US 












(% of US) 
United States  100 0.0 0.0  100 
European 
Union 
88.2 4.4  5.3  78.5 
Japan  67.5 0.1  2.6  64.8 
 
Individual EU Member States 
France  106.6 5.2  7.5  93.9 
Germany  91.7 7.2  4.6  80.0 
Belgium  106.3 4.9  8.5  92.8 
Spain  73.6 0.2  8.6  64.9 
Greece  64.2 -2.3 10.4  56.1 
Ireland  103.6 2.8  4.8  96.0 
Italy  91.8 3.8 11.3 76.7 
Netherlands  100.2 9.2  -0.9  91.9 
Portugal  52.6 1.9  2.6  48.2 
UK  78.6 2.1 -0.6 77.0 
Source : G. Cette (Banque de France) 
 
- 94 -  
GRAPHS 1 + 2 : FIRM LEVEL ANALYSIS OF EU AND US PRODUCTIVITY 
AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS 
 







Graph 1 : US v EU Productivity : Firm Level Analysis 
Top US firms are substantially more 
productive than top EU firms
US firms in the bottom quartile 
are substantially less productive 
than equivalent EU firms
 
 









Annual Average Growth : 1995-2000
US EU
Graph 2 : US and EU Employment Growth : Firm Level Analysis 
Top US firms grow faster than 
top EU firms
US eliminates its least 
productive firms, the EU does 
not
Source : Fostering excellence : Challenges for productivity growth in Europe, Draft discussion paper 
for the Informal Competitiveness Council, 1-3 July 2004 (Netherlands’ Ministry of Economic Affairs) 
based on work by Prof. E. Bartelsman, Economic and Social Institute, Free University of Amsterdam. 
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GRAPH 3 : MEASURING THE INNOVATION GAP BETWEEN THE EU AND THE US 





Composite Innovation Indicator based on a set of 
comparable data for 12 indicators*
*EU-US gap is mainly due to 3 indicators (patents, working population with tertiary 
education and business sector R&D expenditures)
US
EU15
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